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 Relating bulk infrastructure requirements to basic household needs is 
not merely matching a supply-side response to aggregate demand 
curves. Both the supply and demand sides must be evaluated 
extremely critically during periods of scarcity (both fiscal/financial 
and ecological) when, as in the case of water for the Gauteng region, 
the society must contend with poor historical planning, inordinately 
unequal access to and use of resources, uncertain intergovernmental 
fiscal relations and municipal fiscal strain, ecological fragility, waste in 
consumption, lack of affordability for basic service consumption, 
ineffective subsidy systems and vigorous contestation of township 
politics. These are general problems common to South African 
infrastructure planning. In the case of the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Project, these problems catalysed a community challenge -- by 
leading activists of Alexandra township, later endorsed by the 
Alexandra Civic Organisation itself -- to not only the municipal and 
national government departments responsible, but to the World 
Bank team which did much of the bulk infrastructure design work. 
The failure of that challenge, in legal terms, does not undermine the 
technical and moral truths which were raised by Alexandra residents 
in 1997-98, which in turn may lay the basis for a more rational 
linkage of bulk and basic infrastructure systems in future. This 
chapter includes the five core documents provided by the Alexandra 
residents, the World Bank, the South African government and the 













The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) has many controversial 
features. When in September 1998 South African National Defence Force 
troops invaded Lesotho to restore a government which had been effectively 
toppled in a coup, it was no accident that its top priority -- ahead of preventing 
Maseru from being largely burned out and looted -- was to gain control of the 
Katse Dam, hundreds of km up the mountains from the main population 
centres. The importance of the LHWP for the water-scarce Gauteng 
metropolis has often been asserted, but an implicit assumption of bulk water 
infrastructure policy has been that the demand for water could not be affected; 
the only infrastructure policy option worth pursuing was to dramatically 
increase supply. 
 In 1998, this assumption became the basis for a quite fruitful (if 
politically charged) public debate. The key documents from that debate are 
included in the following pages. Following the lead argument against the 
expansion of the LHWP by three (then-anonymous)1 residents of Alexandra 
township (Section II), the World Bank explains why the costs of delay outweigh 
the benefits (Section III). The Minister and Director-General of Water Affairs 
and Forestry add, based on a newspaper article, the issue of potential economic 
damage from drought (Section IV). The official World Bank response to the 
Request follows (Section V), along with the Inspection Panel findings (Section 
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II. The Alexandra Residents' Request2 
 
DATE:  23 April 1998 
TO:  The World Bank Inspection Panel, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, 
D.C. 20433 
FROM:  Three Alexandra residents 
 
1. Introduction:  Background 
 
1.1 Introduction. We urgently request the Inspection Panel to investigate the 
World Bank's role in the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)... 
 
1.2 The LHWP. By way of background to the LHWP itself, concerns have 
often been expressed about design flaws associated with the first (completed) 
dam (Katse, Phase 1A). This Request is based on the argument that both Phase 
1A and the next dam to be built -- Mohale (along with a diversion weir and 
tunnel to the Katse Reservoir), known as "Phase 1B" -- cause harm to the 
claimants and others similarly situated. Indeed we believe that a $50 million 
World Bank loan for Phase 1B now being considered by the Executive 
Directors should be delayed until our concerns are addressed. 
 
1.3 Original LHWP consultation with affected parties. The LHWP is the 
result of a 1986 treaty between the apartheid South Africa regime and a military 
regime in Lesotho that took power in a coup. By definition, hence, there was 
improper Bank consultation about the LHWP with these two states' citizens, 
many of whom in the mid-1980s were suffering imprisonment, torture and 
state-sanctioned murder for speaking out on behalf of democracy and 
development. This is not a theoretical issue, for during the 1980s the African 
National Congress formally opposed the LHWP. Under these circumstances, 
there was apparently no attention given by the World Bank design team to the 
concerns we have always had, in South Africa's impoverished urban townships, 
about the elimination of poverty, equity in resource allocation, universal access 
to water and water conservation. The result of not consulting was construction 
of a megaproject with many serious defects. 
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1.4 Recognition of flawed design process. The LHWP's legitimacy and the 
Bank's consultative process in project design have been called into question 
many times, and are beyond dispute. At an NGO conference on the LHWP in 
August 1996, for example, an official (Michael Potts) of the Development Bank 
of Southern Africa (DBSA) conceded, "Given the limited access to foreign 
funds by the South African government and the limitations on contractors' 
funding proposals -- export credit was not available to South Africa -- a very 
complex treaty was negotiated to bypass [anti-apartheid financial] sanctions. In 
Lesotho the credibility of the treaty was also questioned because the military 
government ruling Lesotho at the time did not permit open debate on the 
treaty." In short, according to even the DBSA official, "The planning of the 
social aspects of the LHWP was subordinate to the technical planning. The 
environment within which the environmental action plan had to be 
implemented was not conducive to sustainable development."  
 
1.5 Other social and ecological issues raised previously. Concerns about 
the LHWP are not limited to consumer issues. At 185 meters, Katse is the 
highest concrete dam in Africa and one of the largest infrastructure projects in 
the world. Phase 1A directly affected 2 000 people --approximately 300 
households -- and indirectly affected at least 20 000 more who lost the use of 
common resources or income through the submersion of 925ha of arable and 
3000ha of grazing land. This has had enormous social, environmental, and 
economic impacts on the people of Lesotho. Recent surveys indicate 
dissatisfaction on the part of Lesotho residents with resettlement schemes and 
provisions for reimbursement. Phase 1B will inundate 550ha of extremely good 
cropland and will force resettlement of 400 families. Following erosion of much 
of Lesotho's arable land over the past three decades, only 9% of the country's 
soil is presently available for cultivation. The proposed Phase 1B will exacerbate 
this situation, and in addition will destroy the habitat of the Maluti Minnow (an 
endangered species), bearded vulture and four other species considered 
"globally threatened." 
 
1.6 Other implementation issues raised previously. Numerous complaints 
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initial Environmental Impact Assessment; a woefully inadequate social plan; 
flooding of ancestral burial grounds; an upsurge of social problems (including 
sexually-transmitted disease and increased stock theft); poor labour relations 
that led to the murder of several workers by Lesotho police in September 1996; 
cost overruns due to an unanticipated need to line the Katse tunnels with 
cement; corruption on the Muela hydropower component of the project and 
funds established to devolve LHWP financial benefits to Lesotho's citizens; 
failure to account for soil erosion and sedimentation of the reservoir; and 
reservoir-induced seismicity that in the village of Mapeleng generated a crack 
1,5 km long that damaged nearly 70 houses. According to the leader of the 
Highlands Church Action Group, "The project shows no sensitivity to the 
impact on gender issues and roles of women." In addition, according to a 
leading academic at the University of the Free State, the effects on the Orange 
River catchment include a "considerable shortfall of water at the mouth... This 
will result in a river mouth that is either dry for years on end apart from 
exceptional floods or will be inundated by seawater intrusion." NGOs in 
Lesotho, South Africa and internationally have repeatedly brought these issues 
to the attention of World Bank staff (for example, at the 1996 conference and 
in continual correspondence between NGOs and the Bank LHWP 
taskmanager since). 
 
1.7 World Bank role. The responsibility of the World Bank for social and 
ecological design problems, as well as the economic miscalculations described 
in more detail below, is also beyond dispute. The LHWP was initially funded by 
the World Bank with a US$110 million loan on condition that South Africa 
stood surety. The Bank has repeatedly stated that its work on this project is 
small (just 5% of total project costs), thereby somehow implying that it is less 
liable for project problems. However, the following description from the 
Lesotho Highlands Development Authority implies a much more critical role:  
"The World Bank acted as a catalyst to bring all the financing together... It is 
also working to ensure that World Bank guidelines on resettlement and social 
impacts are met. The World Bank has the capacity to advise on ensuring that 
adequate attention is given to sensitive environmental issues. The World Bank's 
involvement assures lenders that the Project is a worthwhile investment 
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opportunity." Thus the World Bank's role in this project extends beyond its 
role as a financial partner. The presence of the Bank provides the catalyst that 
allows the project to exist, and is supposed to provide guarantees of technical 
assistance and leadership on mitigation of social and environmental impacts. By 
rushing this project and requesting approval for financing from Bank Executive 
Directors before necessary studies and public participation have taken place, 
Bank staff are undermining the credibility of the institution and the LHWP, 
and, we argue, are causing material harm to the people of South Africa and 
Lesotho. 
 
1.8 South Africans' financial obligations. Part of that harm can be measured 
in rands and cents. According to the Bank, "In terms of the Treaty, South 
Africa bears the full costs of the project as well as the associated debt, except 
for a hydroelectric component which will supply all of Lesotho's power 
requirements and which is being financed 100% by Lesotho with donor 
assistance. Lesotho bears none of the costs linked to the water transfer 
component of the project." As Water Affairs and Forestry Minister Kader 
Asmal put it in a speech to the 1996 Group for Environmental Monitoring 
Workshop on the LHWP, "The debt related to the water transfer part of this 
project will be redeemed by South Africa through income generated by the 
project. In other words, the end users will pay for the project, at tariffs well 
within the capabilities of the beneficiaries, making it economically viable." This 
is the crucial point of debate, and we want to assert that, in hindsight, Minister 
Asmal -- and World Bank staff who have advised him on water pricing, at retail 
level, for low-income residents of Gauteng townships -- are incorrect in this 
statement. 
 
1.9 Relative water access by low-income consumers. Gauteng consumers 
bear the bulk of the LHWP costs, both for capital and recurrent expenditures. 
But millions of the province's low-income citizens are already beset by severe 
problems of poverty, disease, environmental decay, geographical segregation 
and women's oppression due to the inadequate levels and high costs of water 
and sanitation services. South Africa's inequality in access to water is striking. 
According to a recent Central Statistical Services Household Survey, only 27% 
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34% have access to flush toilets. By consuming less than 2% of all South 
Africa's water, the country's black township residents together use less than a 
third of the amount used in middle- and upper-income swimming pools and 
gardens, not to mention white domestic (in-house) consumption or massive 
water wastage by white farmers who have had enormous irrigation subsidies 
over the years and who use 50% of South Africa's water. Moreover, out of 
every 100 drops that flow through Gauteng pipes, 24 quickly leak into the 
ground through faulty bulk infrastructure. Still more waste occurs in leaky 
communal, yard and house taps. In the higher elevations of Alexandra 
township, these problems are witnessed in the perpetual lack of water pressure. 
Hundreds of thousands of low-income people in Alexandra and other 
townships have no immediate house or yard access to reticulated water 
supplied by our Johannesburg municipality, and instead receive at best only 
communal access, with all the public health problems that this implies. Indeed, 
the lack of available water on a universal basis means that public health 
conditions are worse; geographical segregation of low-income Gauteng 
residents (from wealthier residents) is more extreme; women are particularly 
inconvenienced, and their income-generation and caregiving capacities are 
reduced; and the environment is threatened (in part because of the shortage of 
water-borne sanitation). For reasons established below, we believe that the 
LHWP expansion will exacerbate rather than ameliorate our access, equity and 
quality problems. This could not come at a worse time, as Gauteng 
municipalities -- including Johannesburg -- are suffering extremely serious 
financial difficulties that are forcing them to dramatically increase the pace of 
water cut-offs to low-income consumers, as well as the retail price of water. 
 
1.10 Alternatives not explored sufficiently. Are there alternatives to Phase 
1B? Bank staff do not know, for as far as we can determine, the desire by 
communities to address our townships' own water-infrastructure shortcomings 
-- especially leaky connector pipes, but also leaky water taps that together cost 
Sowetans approximately 40% of our water -- has never been fully explored or 
supported by Bank staff. The possibility for changing water usage patterns 
through progressive block tariffs has not been factored in (in part because Bank 
staff explicitly oppose differential pricing of water). The impact of water 
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conservation education has not been considered. The possibilities for 
regulations prohibiting excessive watering of suburban gardens has not been 
addressed by Bank staff. The potential for saving water through clearing 
invasive alien trees has not been calculated. The physical replacement or 
installation of low-flow showerheads, dual-flush toilets, and similar mechanical 
interventions have not been addressed. These are crucial alternatives which 
could ameliorate the need for the remaining phases of the Lesotho project. 
These alternative options have not been taken seriously, as far as we can tell 
from analysing Bank-supplied information. 
 
2. The Inspection Panel Request 
 
2.1 Requestors as affected parties. As residents of Alexandra township, we 
are part of the low-income consumer population who must pay a 
disproportionate bill for the LHWP. As "affected parties," the claimants and 
others similarly situated have suffered and will suffer harm because of 
violations of Bank policies associated with LHWP Phases 1A and 1B, as 
outlined below. We live within the country or an area immediately affected by 
the Bank-financed project. Finally, through the contacts of our technical 
advisors, Non-Governmental Organisations here and abroad, community 
organisations in Alexandra with which we are allied, and more general public 
pressure and publicity, our concerns have been repeatedly raised with Bank 
management. We are not satisfied with the response, particularly in relation to 
the possibilities of combining demand-side management with universal access 
to water. 
 
2.2 Summary of Request. To briefly summarise our concerns, the LHWP 
represents an expensive, ecologically unsound water supply project 
whose expansion is not needed for many years (by some estimates, two 
decades) and that has resulted and will result in a variety of problems 
that represent material harm to the claimants and our allies: 
 
2.2.1 rising water prices (thus adversely affecting the ability of low-
income people to gain access to water, and in the process lowering 
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costs borne by women, children and the elderly); 
 
            
2.2.2 less incentive to instigate demand-side management measures  
(hence leaving townships with failing infrastructure and limiting the 
ability of service providers to cross-subsidise); 
 
2.2.3 increased fiscal stress on municipalities (which in turn will cost 
workers their jobs and/or income, and will lead to greater pressure to 
reduce subsidies to low-income people and to cut off water in the 
event of nonpayment); and 
 
2.2.4 fewer resources for the capital and recurrent subsidies required 
to improve and construct water supply infrastructure appropriate for 
low-income communities. 
 
2.3 Phase 1B delay is feasible. Over the past six months, information has 
been presented publicly and privately by South African authorities as well as 
Bank staff, that lead us to conclude that a significant delay in further LHWP 
construction is not only possible but would save hundreds of millions of Rand 
per year (even considering the continuation of payments to Lesotho for water 
that would have been delivered with Phase 1B, and the economic loss to 
Lesotho if 1B was delayed). As stated by an official of Rand Water and reported 
in Johannesburg newspapers on 13 March 1998, "we could drop supply by 
40%" and in the process delay the LHWP "by years," hence "conservatively" 
saving R800 million per annum. That money could be spent on demand-side 
management alternatives that would conserve water and assure equity. 
 
2.4 Demand-side alternatives not yet investigated. We understand that 
Bank staff still have not required a full study of demand-side management 
alternatives before recommending a new LHWP loan, despite its own policies 
on Alternatives, Economic Evaluation of Investment Options and Water 
Resources Management, among others. Communications from Bank staff 
concede that demand-side management should have been studied in much 
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greater detail at the outset, but the concluding argument is that the project is 
"too far along" to make a delay economically viable. Despite requests and 
extensive publicity about the issue in the South African press, information or 
studies that would clarify the economic consequences of enhanced demand-
side management have not been made available to us. 
 
2.5 Shortcomings in Bank study on economics of a delay. The Bank's 
March 1998 study on the economics of a delay in the LHWP downplays the 
possibility of substantial demand-side management interventions. The new 
report assumes a 3,3% annual water demand increase in Gauteng, and therefore 
clearly does not take demand-side management arguments seriously. 
Specifically, the new study makes the following comments about demand-side 
management, which indicate a lack of serious consideration of the issues under 
debate:  "It is not clear what the scope is for further demand management... 
Demand management capabilities and their impact in South Africa are 
theoretical and have not yet been tried and tested... The last thorough analysis 
of water demand in the Vaal system was done in the mid-1980s." 
 
2.6 Implications of proceeding too rapidly with Phase 1B. Thus we are 
concerned that the decision to proceed based largely on sunk costs ignores the 
significant economic benefit of demand-side management (thereby failing to 
seriously consider a viable and important alternative, in violation of several 
Bank policies). Bank staff seem intent on moving this forward despite clear and 
obvious problems and policy violations, and we question the incentive structure 
that appears to encourage Bank staff to throw good money after bad. Bank 
staff appear to be motivated to move money for the sake of moving money, 
rather than carefully considering the implications of moving forward with the 
project or the cost savings, social and environmental benefits inherent in a 
delay. We question the wisdom of throwing more money at a project when 
important questions about the need for the project exist. We also note that, as 
discussed more fully below, continuing with this project will have an enormous 
effect on South Africa's future water management planning. 
 
2.7 Implications of delaying Phase 1B loan decision. A reconsideration of 
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assessment, consultation, and consideration of investment alternatives would 
allow the parties concerned to save money and would give further incentive to 
South African state agencies -- at national, catchment-area and municipal levels 
-- to focus on steps that are consistent with the objectives of poverty alleviation 
and access to water for the poor. The authorities could take steps to fix the 
region's badly leaking delivery system, install water-conserving appurtenances, 
and implement measures such as tariff reform to reduce use by the biggest and 
most wasteful users. Otherwise, we believe this very costly project will force 
Rand Water -- responsible for 18% of debt-service costs of the project -- to sell 
greater amounts of higher cost water. The requirement that Rand Water pays 
for the unneeded water will generate a strong disincentive for conservation. We 
believe that the Bank has failed to adequately consider the impacts that the 
project will have on South African consumers and the environment. 
 
2.8 Delay of approximately ten months required. A delay in a funding 
decision is necessary until a demand-side management report is prepared, which 
is anticipated in early 1999. We understand there have been no public studies 
that document the economic impact on Rand Water of bringing this water on-
line before it is needed. Given the inaccuracy of earlier Bank demand estimates 
(which were overoptimistic by a factor of 40%), the project's economic analysis 
could be profoundly affected by new information on demand. Moving ahead 
before the information is complete violates policies on Economic Evaluation. 
To wait ten months for more scientific demand-side management studies 
would not, Bank staff concede in the study on the economics of delay, result in 
the withdrawal of favourable bids by construction companies. 
 
2.9 Implications for retail water pricing and investment. Finally, the 
claimants are also concerned that the high cost of LHWP water will worsen the 
impact that follows directly from other Bank advice to the South African 
government regarding fiscal management, water pricing and infrastructure 
investment. The Bank's policy advice and the Bank's promotion of LHWP are 
integrally linked, as was demonstrated during an October 1995 presentation by 
Bank staff to a Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) conference. 
At that conference, detailed water pricing principles contrary to those 
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advocated by civic associations and even the main purchaser of LHWP water, 
Rand Water, were promoted during a Bank slide presentation on the LHWP, 
notwithstanding explicit suggestions to the contrary by civic movement 
representatives and Rand Water in consultations prior to the conference. 
Indeed the Bank's South African policy advice -- in the water sector for both 
urban consumers and low-income rural farmers (during the October 1995 
conference and in subsequent communications with DWAF) and regarding 
infrastructure investment (the Urban Infrastructure Investment Framework of March 
1995) -- has consistently contradicted the traditional civic movement demand, 
and constitutional guarantee, that water is considered a human right, and that a 
universal entitlement be provided. The Bank staff's advice is also opposite to 
that found in the 1994 World Development Report:  Infrastructure for Development, and 
is fundamentally incompatible with the Bank's mission of poverty reduction, as 
discussed below. 
 
2.10 Implications for municipal fiscal stress. Municipalities have borne the 
costs of rising water prices and limited retail affordability in recent months, and 
are passing them on to workers, who are increasingly suffering wage and 
retrenchment pressure, and to communities, in the form of increased levels of 
water cut-offs. This reflects both overall municipal fiscal stress (as central to 
local grants declined by 85% in real terms from 1991/92 to 1997/98) as well as 
higher priced bulk water costs. Debts by Gauteng municipalities for bulk 
sewerage and bulk water supplies that are more than 60 days overdue amounted 
to R69 million at the end of 1997, and another R20 million in water-related 
debts were between 30 and 60 days overdue. The 24 Gauteng municipalities 
raised total income of R968 million from water bills to all classes of consumers 
in 1997 and spent R1 019 million on water services (a deficit of R51 million). In 
contrast, of the 236 municipalities that report across South Africa, water bills 
raised R2 414 million in 1997, and expenditures were just R2 388 million (a 
surplus of R26 million). This is surprising given that Gauteng is South Africa's 
wealthiest province. The fiscal stress caused by deficits on the water account are 
part of the reason that the following Gauteng municipalities were declared, in 
December 1997, to be in default of government "viability" criteria (sufficient 
cash and investments to meet one month's personnel bill):  Johannesburg, 















2.11 Implications for low-income residents. The direct consequence of 
rising indebtedness has been intensified municipal "credit control" against those 
households who can not afford to pay for increasingly costly water. Rand Water 
price increases announced in February 1998 -- which were more than 50% 
above the inflation rate, because 75% of the increase is from the LHWP -- will 
affect the claimants at a time that unemployment is increasing, overall 
municipal bills are being increased and some wealthy ratepayers are offering 
stiff resistance to paying their fair share. The implications of rising water prices 
and the lack of a "lifeline tariff" -- a basic water service available to even to the 
very poor -- include not only switching of funds in household budgets away 
from other necessities, but also a dramatic increase in residential water cut-offs 
in Gauteng since early 1997. According to the Department of Constitutional 
Development's "Project Viability," 24 out of the 30 Gauteng local authorities 
(representing a population of more than 12 million people) that replied to an 
official questionnaire, engaged in water cut-offs. These cut-offs affected 512 
households in the first quarter of 1997, 932 households in the second quarter, 1 
210 households in the third quarter and 5 472 households in the fourth quarter. 
The ability of many of these households to afford their bills was limited, as 
witnessed by the fact that only 252, 449, 613 and 1 064 Gauteng households 
were reconnected in those four quarters of 1997, respectively. There are many 
other potential indicators of the costs of increasing water tariffs associated with 
the LHWP, including public health costs and ecological problems (as excessive 
water-borne sanitation costs lead to informal sanitation arrangements), most of 
which generate a bias against low-income women, which should also be 
researched and factored into the water pricing and access policies. However, 
these are at present not being adequately considered, due to the intensive 
pressure municipalities face to balance their books in the very short term... 
 
[Sections 3 and 4 are omitted as they merely deal with contact between the 
claimants, the World Bank and the South African government.] 
 
5. Applicable World Bank Policies and Operational Directives 
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5.1 Relevant policies. The World Bank abides by numerous policies and 
procedures that may have been violated by the LHWP. These policies are 
applicable (though not universally) to Phase 1A as well as (universally) to the 
next phase of the project, Phase 1B, now under consideration by the Bank. The 
following are relevant policies which we believe were violated by Phase 1A 
(though some did not apply at the time 1A was constructed) and that will be 
violated by Phase 1B. 
 
5.2 OD 4.00, Environmental Policy for Dam and Reservoir Projects 
(Consultation). Para 19. Consultation with Nongovernmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and Affected Groups, states:  "Community organizations, research 
centers, environmental advocates, and other NGOs can often provide valuable 
perspectives on improving both project design and implementation. To tap 
these perspectives, the Bank encourages consultations by project authorities 
(including consultants preparing the project) with appropriate NGOs, 
particularly local NGOs... In addition, the Bank encourages consultation 
between project executing agencies and the population affected by the project, 
as part of the project design process." 
 
5.2.1   As consumers and citizens who will have to pay for the LHWP, we 
have not had a truly adequate consultation with the Bank at any stage of this 
project, but the failure to consult more widely, notwithstanding 
opportunities presented to World Bank staff, is especially evident and 
problematic in light of the questions raised about demand-side management 
and project costs. 
 
5.2.2    We believe it essential that civil society be brought into a public 
debate about the expansion of the LHWP, in part through a project delay. 
Because low-income water consumers have not been adequately consulted, 
we will suffer adverse consequences, including less access to Government 
officials and lower consciousness of our conditions than would have 
otherwise been the case had Bank staff taken seriously their mandate in the 
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5.3 OD 4.00, Environmental Policy for Dam and Reservoir Projects 
(Design Alternatives). Para. 5, Design Alternatives, states:  "Design of 
investment programs for supplying water or energy should consider demand 
management as well as supply options (e.g., conservation of water and energy, 
efficiency improvements, system integration, cogeneration, and fuel 
substitution)." 
 
5.3.1   The Bank has not fully investigated demand-side management 
options during the planning of either phase of the LHWP. As noted above, 
Bank staff have inadequately responded to findings relating to demand-side 
management, by failing to conduct rigorous evaluations prior to seeking 
further funding for 1B. It is possible that effective demand-side management 
could delay for many years the need for this massive project, and Bank 
staff's failure to consider this possibility seriously is a fundamental violation 
of Bank policy with considerable economic, social and environmental 
impacts. Moreover, the Bank's initial 1A demand calculations were terribly 
inaccurate -- 40% higher than actually occurred -- and it is worrying that 
scientific analysis associated with 1B-related water demand will not be 
available for some time. 
 
5.3.2   Demand-side management in the townships has not been taken 
seriously by officials, for it is only now that attempts to address faulty, 
apartheid-era infrastructure are being made, and even now only in a tentative 
way without sufficient financial commitment. It is true that there are (very 
minor) financial commitments now being made in these areas, but in the 
context of municipal fiscal stress discussed above these are not likely to 
make a substantial difference. We are aware that the Bank has made its own 
contributions to South African debates over demand-side management, but 
in these contributions, Bank staff have overstressed financial (not economic) 
efficiency measures (through a proposed pricing system) and downplayed -- 
often even arguing explicitly against -- entitlement access through the kind of 
lifeline tariff and progressive block tariff measures supported widely in 
South African townships, and endorsed in the World Development Report 1994 
and the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The latter document clearly 
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specified the need for tariff restructuring, cross-subsidies and lifeline services 
to the poor: 
 
To ensure that every person has an adequate 
water supply, the national tariff structure must 
include the following: 
 
• a lifeline tariff to ensure that all South 
Africans are able to afford water services 
sufficient for health and hygiene 
requirements; 
• in urban areas, a progressive block tariff to 
ensure that the long-term costs of 
supplying large-volume users are met and 
that there is a cross-subsidy to promote 
affordability for the poor, and 
• in rural areas, a tariff that covers operating 
and maintenance costs of services, and 
recovery of capital costs from users on the 
basis of a cross-subsidy from urban areas 
in cases of limited rural affordability 
(section 2.6.10). 
 
5.3.3 Similar points were also made repeatedly in the World Development Report 
1994, though they were rejected by Bank staff operating in South Africa 
(both in the water pricing advice and in the Urban Infrastructure Investment 
Framework): 
 
There are, however, ways in which infrastructure 
subsidies can be structured to improve their 
effectiveness in reaching the poor. For example, for 
water, increasing-block tariffs can be used -- 
charging a particularly low "lifeline" rate for the first 
part of consumption (for example, 25 to 50 liters per 
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"blocks" of water. This block tariff links price to 
volume, and it is more efficient at reaching the poor 
than a general subsidy because it limits subsidized 
consumption. Increasing-block tariffs also encourage 
water conservation and efficient use by increasing 
charges at higher use. These tariffs are most 
effective when access is universal. When the poor 
lack access, as is frequently the case, they do not 
receive the lifeline rate and typically end up paying 
much higher prices for infrastructure services or 
their substitutes (pp.80-81). 
 
5.3.4 The Bank staff's acts of omission are having and will continue to have 
serious material, adverse consequences for low-income residents -- such as 
water cut-offs, water wastage and unhygienic conditions associated with 
leaky township water systems -- and will in the process exacerbate the 
dramatic inequalities between races and income groups inherited from the 
apartheid era. 
 
5.3.5 As mentioned above, many design alternatives to the LHWP are now 
being seriously explored within DWAF. Yet various demand-side techniques 
have apparently not been factored into demand schedules or demand curves 
for the Vaal basin. They include repairing our townships' leaky connector 
pipes and leaky water taps, modernising and fixing meters, changing water 
usage patterns through progressive block tariffs, promoting water-sensitive 
gardening and food production, intensifying water conservation education, 
regulating or prohibiting excessive watering of suburban gardens, 
implementing other water use regulation, clearing invasive alien trees, 
promoting school water audits, billing consumer with more informative 
material, and installing low-flow showerheads, dual-flush toilets and similar 
mechanical interventions. The Bank has the resources to -- and should as a 
matter of policy -- evaluate such options, but in the case of both phases of 
LHWP, did not. In violation of Bank policies, alternative options have not 
been considered seriously. 
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5.4 OD 10.04, Economic Evaluation of Investment Options. Para. 3, 
Alternatives, states:  "Consideration of alternatives is one of the most important 
features of proper project analysis throughout the project cycle. To ensure that 
the project maximizes expected net present value, subject to financial, 
institutional, and other constraints, the Bank and the borrower explore 
alternative, mutually exclusive, designs. The project design is compared with 
other designs involving differences in such important aspects as choice of 
beneficiaries, types of outputs and services, production technology, location, 
starting date, and sequencing of components. The project is also compared 
with the alternative of not doing it at all." Moreover, Para 5, Sustainability, 
states:  "To obtain a reasonable assurance that the project`s benefits will 
materialize as expected and will be sustained throughout the life of the project, 
the Bank assesses the robustness of the project with respect to economic, 
financial, institutional, and environmental risks. Bank staff check, among other 
things, (a) implementation to ensure that the project functions as designed, and 
9b) whether critical private and institutional stakeholders have or will have the 
incentives to implement the project successfully." 
 
5.4.1  There has been little or no analysis of how building either 1A from 
1986-97, or building the proposed 1B now, before the water is needed, has 
affected and will affect Rand Water and its end-users, especially low-income 
users with inadequate access to water or who suffer the effects of failing 
infrastructure. Analysis conducted to date does not sufficiently evaluate 
alternatives to 1B, by fully considering the costs and benefits -- including 
social and environmental benefits -- of not building the project. In short, 
Bank analysis regarding 1A was innocent of any of the economic and 
sustainability concerns we raise now, and analysis of 1B's optimum starting 
date has not seriously incorporated demand-side management possibilities, 
and hence is weighted toward funding and completing the project at the 
earliest opportunity. A more thorough analysis of 1B may reveal that a major 
delay is not only cost-effective but also desirable. 
 
5.4.2  One important economic justification for building the project now is 
the possibility of a major drought. The detailed economic analysis of 











Background Research Series                                                                Municipal Services Project 
19 
dam, have not been shared with affected communities. Whether demand-
side management that could reduce the supply need by 40% would mitigate 
the drought costs has not been considered by the Bank. Moreover, the 
expansion of water storage (through Phase 1B's construction) beyond that 
presently required will have the effect of hindering conservation efforts, 
compared to the option of dam delay, thus exacerbating problems in the 
event of a drought. 
 
5.4.3 The sustainability of Phase 1B has not been securely established, since 
a thorough study on its impacts on the downstream environment is not yet 
complete and will not be for a few years. The Orange River is already 
suffering from over-allocation problems downstream, and this project will 
add to that problem. Again, the Bank is proceeding with a project without 
considering the important social and environmental impacts of its actions, in 
violation of its policies. 
 
5.4.4 This project is also not sustainable economically, due to the burden it 
will place on Rand Water and its end-users. To illustrate, according to 1995 
Bank reports, a cubic meter of water from the Vaal Dam costs (in SA 
currency) 8 cents (US$0,016), from Bloemhof 10 cents, from Tugela Vaal 21 
cents, and from the combination of Lesotho's Katse (complete) and Mohale 
(proposed), a staggering R1,50 (US$0,30). Bank staff have told Minister 
Asmal that it would be "economically appropriate" to raise the price of Vaal 
water from 30 cents to R1,50 per cubic meter. To put this in perspective, the 
three other projects provide Gauteng with 2,3 billion cubic meters a year, 
while the two Lesotho dams together would add just another billion. There 
has been no published information on whether the economy of Gauteng 
can absorb such price increases. 
 
5.5 OD 4.07, Water Resources Management. Para. 1 states:  "Bank 
involvement in water resources management entails support for providing 
portable water, sanitation facilities, flood control, and water for productive 
activities in a manner that is economically viable, environmentally sustainable, 
and socially equitable." Moreover, Para. 2 states:  "The Bank assists borrowers 
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in the following priority areas:  (a) Developing a comprehensive framework for 
designing water resource investments, policies and institutions. Within this 
framework, when the borrower develops and allocates water resources, it 
considers cross-sectoral impacts in a regional setting (i.e. a river basin). (b) 
Adopting pricing and incentive policies that achieve cost recovery, water 
conservation, and better allocation of water resources. (c) Decentralizing water 
service delivery, involving users in planning and managing water projects, and 
encouraging stakeholders to contribute to policy formulation. The Bank 
recognizes that a variety of organizations `private firms, financially autonomous 
entities, and community organizations `may contribute to decentralizing water 
delivery functions. Thus it supports projects that introduce different forms of 
decentralized management, focusing on the division of responsibilities among 
the public and private entities involved. (d) Restoring and preserving aquatic 
eco-systems and guarding against overexploitation of groundwater resources, 
giving priority to the provision of adequate water and sanitation services for the 
poor." 
 
5.5.1  Because the LHWP will result in water cost increases (9% this year, 
following a 30% increase last year) of above the inflation rate (last year 
below 8% and presently below 6%) for poor users (according to Standard 
and Poors analysis of Rand Water, and in a press conference on 27 
February, according to Rand Water itself), and because it will add supply that 
is not needed at this time, the LHWP does not meet the standard of social 
equity described in this directive, and fundamentally contradicts the terms of 
Op 4.07. It will likely reduce the incentive to force the biggest users to 
practice water-conservation and will not encourage better allocation of 
resources -- in fact, more likely Phase 1B will have the opposite effect. 
 
5.6 OD 4.15 Poverty Reduction. Para. 28 states:  "The Bank`s role in 
supporting poverty reduction through individual investment operations goes 
beyond financing. The Bank supports sustainable, high return projects and 
project components that benefit the poor and that would not be done, or 
would be done differently, without the Bank. Since an improved policy 
framework can increase the returns to individual projects, Bank project support 
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against the poor." Moreover, Para. 39. states:  "Popular Participation and 
NGOs Effective implementation and operation of most poverty-reduction 
projects require the active involvement of the beneficiaries. Active beneficiary 
participation also should be built into earlier stages of the project cycle. 
Participation is most critical to the success of projects designed to help specific 
groups of people. It is important, for example, in family planning, community 
health, food security, urban upgrading, nutrition, and community water supply 
projects."  
 
5.6.1   In contradiction of the terms of OD 5.16, this project will create 
undue burdens on low-income people, not only on project-affected people 
in Lesotho, but in Gauteng Province, where as noted, water rates have 
already risen dramatically due to the LHWP and are expected to rise further 
as the LHWP bills begin to rise. Bank staff have in fact helped to undermine 
attempts to serve the needs of low-income people and rather than 
eliminating, are encouraging "policy and institutional biases against the 
poor." To undertake such a costly infrastructure project well before it is 
needed shows, we believe, a bias against low-income people (in favour of 
those associated with the very profitable construction of the LHWP), who 
would be better served by changes in water allocation, repair of leaky 
infrastructure, a daily lifeline amount of water (50-60 liters per capita per day 
is the Reconstruction and Development Programme medium-term objective) and 
other approaches. 
 
5.6.2   As noted above, affected people have not been fully consulted, not at 
early stages nor more recently, about the impact of the water pricing 
implications of the LHWP on poverty. Within the past six months, 
hundreds of thousands of low-income South Africans have had their 
personal water supplies cut off as municipal authorities have had to come to 
grips with persistently lower Intergovernmental Grants (in 1997-98, 85% 
below the real 1991-92 levels, according to the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission). These diminished transfers, which explicitly harm low-income 
consumers, are apparently required because of the ambitious deficit 
reduction targets in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy adopted 
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in June 1996, following extensive World Bank staff inputs and Bank 
modelling, but without an adequate safety net for those in default on 





6.1 Summary information. We state the above concerns as summary 
information. There is a great deal of backup documentation available to justify 
all of our concerns, including detailed e-mail discussions with World Bank staff 
that record the Bank's failure to adequately carry out conservation and equity 
measures, and Bank acknowledgement that a long delay in the next phase of the 
project is not unreasonable. The claimants will provide the panel with this 
information, much of which needs to be kept confidential to protect claimants' 
identity, in a supplemental package. 
 
6.2 Wide support for demand-side management approach. There is, in 
fact, little controversy over the need for South Africa to focus more on 
demand-side management. The case for a delay in the LHWP's expansion is 
strongly supported in South Africa, and indeed the environmental reporter for 
Business Day newspaper recently (on 19 March) concluded that "calls for delay 
[in Phase 1B]... may be justified in order to allow SA to clean up its own 
backyard concerning water wastage." As the Bank's LHWP task manager 
himself expressed the shortcomings of previous Bank studies (in an October 
1997 memo), "All of this shows that if demand management had been on the 
table in 1986 at the time of the treaty negotiation, and if the commitment to 1B 
had not been made on the terms that it was -- then the whole story would be 
different. Lesson:  push the demand management stuff." 
 
6.3 Conclusion. It is therefore logical both for the Bank Inspection Panel to 
initiate an investigation, and for the Executive Directors of the Bank to delay 
any funding approval until a clearer picture emerges of whether the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project should go ahead as is currently envisaged, or whether 
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III. The World Bank Response (1): 
"The Economics of Phase 1B"3 
 
DATE:  April 24, 1998 
FROM:  World Bank (Africa Region), Washington, DC 
 
 
1. Introduction and summary4 
 
One of the critical questions in assessing Phase 1B is its economic viability, i.e. 
whether the benefits of the project outweigh its costs by a sufficient margin to 
justify the investment and the associated environmental and social costs. This 
note summarizes this economic assessment for Phase 1B. It concludes that the 
project has a rate of return of nearly 16%, is more economical and feasible than 
alternative supply restrictions or demand management efforts (which 
nevertheless are being pursued to curb the demand for water in coming 
decades), and is the least cost option among available alternatives. 
 In addition, the benefits far outweigh the costs for both partners in the 
project, South Africa and Lesotho. For South Africa, it is the least cost option 
to supply water to the Gauteng region and for Lesotho, it generates 
considerable additional revenue and economic activity that will play a critical 
role in Lesotho's economic development. There are environmental and social 
costs associated with the project, principally due to resettlement, loss of 
economic resources, possible adverse health and social impacts of the 
construction activities on the remote mountain area, and some impacts on the 
natural environment. The plans for mitigation of these impacts are included in 
the project costs and the rate of return calculations, and amount to 8% of the 
total project costs. If implemented fully, they are likely to mitigate most of the 
losses and will generate some additional benefits to people affected by the 
project. Even drastic changes in the assessment of the environmental and social 
costs will have a small impact on the economic viability of the project (even if 













This assessment only considers the incremental benefits of costs of Phase 1B 
and for most of the analysis, all benefits and costs incurred under Phase 1A that 
may have an impact on Phase 1B will be considered sunk and will not be 
included in the assessment. In the cost-effectiveness analysis, however, the 
cost-effectiveness of 1B alone as well as 1A and 1B together will also be 
assessed. Based on most recent assessments of water demand in South Africa, 
it was determined that Phase 1B reduction in demand could possibly have 
enabled a delay of up to 7 years. Such a delay is not cost-effective at this stage 
and very damaging to Lesotho (see separate document). The very conservative 
assumption used for the cost-benefit analysis is, however, to assume that the 
water will not generate any benefits to South African water users until 2010 
(seven years after the completion of Phase 1B). 
 For the project to make economic sense, the benefits must exceed the 
costs for the project as a whole, from South Africa's point of view, and from 
Lesotho's point of view. The project must therefore be analyzed from these 
three points of view. Table 1 summarizes the benefits and costs of the project 
from the three points of view. The major costs of the project are the 
investment costs, the environmental and social losses associated with the 
project, and the costs associated with mitigating these losses. In addition, there 
may be costs borne by downstream agricultural users in the lower Orange River 
in South Africa, where after a string of exceptionally dry years, there may be less 
water available for irrigation use in the lower Orange.5 The most important 
benefits are the benefits to consumers in South Africa of more water (in the 
face of rising industrial and household demand for water in the Gauteng area), 
the revenues to the South African government of selling bulk water, additional 
hydropower benefits of 1B water flowing through the Muela hydropower 
station (at no additional cost), the benefits of environmental and social 
mitigation expenditures, and the economic activity and infrastructure (roads, 
powerlines, buildings, etc.) generated by the project. For South Africa and 
Lesotho, the assessment is slightly different as the costs and benefits are 
apportioned asymmetrically between the two countries. South Africa bears the 
project costs, most of the environmental and social mitigation expenditures, 
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irrigated agriculture in the lower Orange, but gets all the consumer and bulk 
sale benefits of the water and some of the economic spin-offs. Lesotho bears 
the environmental and social losses and pays a small share of the rural 
development program (those elements going beyond the direct compensation), 
gets none of the water use benefits, but receives the royalties, the hydropower 
benefits, the benefits of all of the environmental and social mitigation measures, 
most of the economic activity generated by the project, and the benefits of all 
the infrastructure. 
 All costs and benefits are expressed in 1995 prices. The 1995 exchange 
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 In order to estimate the benefits to South African consumers of the 
additional water supplied by Phase 1B, the situation with Phase 1B has to be 
compared to a situation without Phase 1B. In other words, what are the costs 
to South African water users to make do without the additional water provided 
by Phase 1B? Three methods of obviating the need for Phase 1B water are 
considered. The first is to simply use the price mechanism to restrict demand to 
a point that Phase 1B water is no longer needed. The loss of consumer surplus 
as a result of the price rise needed to make do without Phase 1B is then the 
benefit of the project (alongside the bulk water revenues and the hydropower 
benefits)6 which is compared to the costs of the investment (project costs plus 
environmental and social mitigation expenditures). A second way to examine 
the alternatives to Phase 1B is to look at ways to restrict the demand either 
through selective water restriction to specific water users (e.g. agriculture, new 
industry in the Gauteng area, power stations) or by generalized demand 
management policies.7 The costs, benefits, timing, and feasibility of these 
strategies are then compared to Phase 1B. While a high rate of return using 
these analyses would suggest that increased water supply through Phase 1B is 
superior to using the water price or selective water restrictions or other demand 
reduction policies to obviate the need for Phase 1B, it does not necessarily 
prove that Phase 1B is the best method to increase water supply to the Gauteng 
area. Therefore, a third way to look at the alternatives to Phase 1B is to examine 
the costs, benefits, timing, and feasibility of other supply alternatives to Phase 
1B. In particular, supplying the same amount of water through an alternative 
Orange River transfer scheme (wholly within South Africa called the OVTS 
which would use the same water transferred by Phase 1B and is thereby a direct 
competitor to Phase 1B) or a transfer scheme from the Tugela River (called the 
TVTS which would use different water but, if found cheaper, should be 
implemented before Phase 1B) will be considered. 
 










a) From the Project's and South Africa's point of view  
 
Based on the consumer surplus analysis, water prices will have to rise 
dramatically (by about 8% in real terms every year) to restrict growing demand 
to available supply.8 This is true even if Phase 1B is implemented. The needed 
price increase is, however, much less than in the case without Phase 1B leading 
to a gain of consumer surplus to South African water users. This surplus, 
combined with the revenues of bulk water sales and the hydropower benefits 
ensure that the real rate of return of Phase 1B is about 15.9%, far above the 
10% cut-off usually applied for projects of this nature. Table 2 shows that only 
inconceivably large escalations in costs and reductions or delays in benefits 
would reduce the rate of return to below 10%. Moreover, even if demand 
changes were so dramatic that they would allow a theoretical delay of Phase 1B 
by 10 years, it would still carry a 14% rate of return. If the water was needed 
after 2025 (allowing for a 22 year delay), the rate of return would fall below 
10%. (This however implicitly assumes that such a delay could be attained at no 
extra cost. If a 22 year delay were to require significant other investments then 
this "switching value" is no longer valid.) This calculation also includes a 
worst-case assumption about the magnitude of losses to downstream 
agricultural users in the lower Orange. Without these worst case assumptions, 
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From South Africa's point of view, the rate of return is only slightly less at 
15.7% since the benefits of increased consumer surplus and bulk water sales are 
much larger than the hydropower benefits (not considered from RSA's point of 
view) and the royalties (added as additional costs from RSA's point of view).10 
The sensitivity analysis shows very similar results to those in Table 2. 
 It has to be investigated whether other supply augmentation schemes 
would be more economical than Phase 1B. The best way to compare different 
schemes using the same measuring rod is to use unit reference values which is 
the price per cubic meter of water which would yield a present value of 
revenues equal to the present values of the project costs, i.e. how much one 
would need to charge for a cubic meter of water to recover all costs. Table 3 
shows the URVs for Phase 1B, the OVTS scheme using the same water, and 
the TVTS scheme using different water. From the project's point of view, 
Phase 1B is considerably cheaper than the two alternative schemes to supply 
water to the Gauteng area. Even when the royalties are considered (which only 
fall due in the case of Phase 1B since the other schemes are wholly within 
South Africa), Phase 1B is cheaper than competing schemes. Thus also from 
South Africa's point of view, Phase 1B is the most economical and timely 
project to be implemented. 
 Table 3 also investigates whether Phase 1A+1B combined are the 
most economical way of supplying water to the Gauteng region. Since Phase 
1B benefits from some sunk expenditures made under Phase 1A (esp. the 
transfer and delivery tunnels from Katse Dam to RSA), the combined URV 
costs for Phase 1 as a whole is larger than for Phase 1B alone. At the same 
time, the table shows that both combined are still much cheaper than the 
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The analyses from the Vaal Augmentation Planning Study also allow a 
comparison of Phase 1B with four alternatives to meet the demand in the 
Gauteng area. The first is to allow no further development of manufacturing 
enterprises in the Gauteng area, thereby reducing the demand for water from 
industry (and the households employed by these industries). The study 
concluded that Gauteng's locational advantage including market access, 
infrastructure, availability of skilled and unskilled labor is so large that Phase 1B 
would have more than a 22% rate of return over imposing the costs of 
restricting industrial development in Gauteng. The second option is to outlaw 
all remaining irrigation in the Vaal catchment area (beyond the moratorium on 
new irrigation in place since the early 1970s). A comparison of the benefits and 
costs of such a policy would yield a rate of return of Phase 1B of about 8%. 
Additional difficulties of such a policy would include the need to upgrade water 
quality of the water currently used for irrigation and the need to transfer water 
from the lower Vaal to the upper Vaal where the most of the non-agricultural 
use takes place as well as the social ramifications of such a policy. Nevertheless, 
changes in the water law and water policies are aimed at reducing the use of 
water in the Vaal catchment area for relatively low value irrigation and will 
further reduce the share of water used for irrigation. 
 The third alternative considered was to force ESKOM to change its 
power stations in the Vaal catchment area from wet to dry cooling. Compared 
with implementing this change, Phase 1B yields a rate of return of 
approximately 14% making supply augmentation cheaper than this demand 
restriction. 
 The fourth alternative are demand management measures to reduce 
the demand for water. Measures include metering, raising water tariffs, loss and 
leakage control, and the like. The VAPS concluded that effective 
implementation of these policies could reduce water demand by 9-12% so that 
the next scheme (after Phase 1B) could be delayed by up to 8 years. The costs 
of such measures (esp. universal metering and effective loss and leakage 
control) were not considered and are likely to be considerable. As far as water 
pricing measures to reduce demand are concerned, they will carry costs to 
consumers of the magnitude described above in the consumer surplus analysis. 
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water demand by DWAF and the Water Boards (including two consecutive 
water tariff hikes of 30% in 1995 and 48.5% in 1997 and aggressive water 
conservation campaigns and regulations to restrict water use and promote the 
use of water-saving devices), which are likely to have already contributed to 
some reduction in water demand. The imposition of water restrictions in 1995 
(during the last drought) have also served to reduce levels of demand. The total 
reductions of demand already achieved could have possibly allowed for a delay 
of Phase 1B by between 4-7 years (the precise magnitude is currently being 
investigated and will not be available for another 1-2 years), had these 
reductions taken place before the implementation of Phase 1B began. As 
shown in a separate analysis, it is not cost-effective to delay the project at this 
stage. Instead, DWAF is delaying any decision on a future project until further 
demand management initiatives have had time to have an effect. 
 
b) From Lesotho's point of view 
 
As Lesotho bears none of the costs related to the water transfer (including all 
environmental and social expenditures directly associated with mitigation and 
compensation) and does not benefits from the transferred water, it is not 
possible to calculate a rate of return from Lesotho's point of view. Nor does 
Lesotho currently use any of the water to be transferred to Gauteng (with the 
possible exception of very small amounts of water immediate downstream of 
the dam for which users will be compensated at South Africa's expense). 
Instead, the question to be examined is whether Lesotho derives sufficient 
benefits from transferring one of its few and most precious resources to South 
Africa. 
 Lesotho will derive a range of permanent and temporary benefits from 
the project. The most important benefits are the royalties associated with the 
additional water to be delivered from Phase 1B. The incremental royalties 
associated with Phase 1B will amount to M 30m per year in 1995 prices, 
equivalent to about 1% of Lesotho's 1995 GDP. These royalties are payable in 
perpetuity, as long as the water is delivered, and are payable regardless of the 
decision to proceed with further phases of LHWP. With Phase 1B fully 
implemented, Lesotho is then expected to earn a total of about M130m in 
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royalties per year (in 1995 prices) for Phase 1A and Phase 1B combined. This is 
equivalent to about 4% of Lesotho's 1995 GDP. A second permanent benefit 
will be the hydropower generated by Phase 1B which will generate about M 
12m (1995 prices) of revenue per year at no additional costs (installed 
hydropower capacity under Phase 1A is designed to include Phase 1B water). 
Third, the increased tourism potential and the permanent infrastructure created 
by the project (including a paved road into the highlands to be built and 
upgraded as part of Phase 1B as well as powerlines, telecommunications 
facilities, and housing and services in the project area) provide further 
permanent benefits to Lesotho. 
 At the same time, Lesotho will bear most of the environmental and 
social losses of the project, including the loss of land and livelihood for several 
hundred households, possible adverse health and safety in the project area, and 
some environmental problem including the threat to two rare species. The 
environmental impact assessment identifies all of the expected losses and the 
environmental action plan is designed to minimize all the losses and fully 
compensate those that are suffering them. The plan is designed to more than 
compensate for the losses incurred and to provide additional benefits (such as 
improved infrastructure, public health and health care, development of tourism 
potential, etc.) to surrounding communities (and host communities of resettled 
households). The economic analysis estimates that the losses incurred will be 
amount to an economic loss of about M300m. Compensation, mitigation, and 
additional development measures going beyond direct financial compensation 
to restore livelihoods in affected communities are expected to cost M370m. 
and, if implemented successfully, should therefore yield about M70m in 
additional benefits to affected communities. 
 In addition to the permanent benefits generated by the project, 
Lesotho will benefit considerably from the construction activities of Phase 1B. 
The project is expected to generate about 3000 jobs for Basotho, yielding a 
total of about M275m in wages. This will be augmented by another M200m of 
wages paid to about 300 Basotho employees of LHDA over the construction 
phase of the project. In addition, sub-contracting and supply opportunities are 
expected to generate M140m in revenues for Basotho companies. SACU 
revenues associated with the project and related economic activity are expected 
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sales, and company taxes from direct project-related activities as well as spin-off 
activities) are expected to bring in about M100m to the government over the 
coming years. In total, the direct and indirect effects of Phase 1B are expected 
to account for 6.5% of GDP in 1998 (3.9% of GDP in 2002), 21.4% (12.3%) 
of value-added in the building and construction sectors, and about 7.4% (9.3%) 
of government revenues. These benefits will all accrue before most of the 
permanent benefits, including the royalties and hydropower benefits (as well as 
the tourism benefits) start materializing in 2003. 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
If implemented as projected, Phase 1B will generate considerable benefits to all 
parties of the project. It carries a very high rate of return that is not sensitive to 
large changes in costs or delays in implementation. It provides huge benefits to 
South African consumers that cannot be generated using alternative water 
supply schemes or means to restrict water demand. For Lesotho, it will assist 
Lesotho in developing one of its very few assets, and generate considerable 
permanent benefits in the form of royalties, hydropower, tourism, and 
infrastructure. The economic activity generated by the project will help Lesotho 
sustain its unprecedented growth boom of the past five years where, with 
substantial assistance from the construction activities of Phase 1A, GDP 
growth averaged more than 8% per year, making it one of the fastest-growing 
economies in the world.12 The SACU and tax revenues generated will also help 
sustain sound government finances which helped GoL turn a deficit of 17% of 
GDP in 1987 into a surplus of 3% in 1994. 
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IV. The Ministry of 
Water Affairs and Forestry Response: 
"Watering Down the Facts" 
 
7 May 1998, Mail and Guardian 
 
The content and the cloak-and-dagger presentation of the article "Damn dams, 
look in your own backyard" (Mail and Guardian, April 30 to May 6), alleging 
powerful opposition to the Lesotho Highlands Project by unnamed Alexandra 
individuals, need to be tested and placed in context. 
 Much of what is said in the name of "residents of Alexandra 
township" reflects the line, indeed the phrasing, of international groups 
opposed to the World Bank, its policies in general, its policies in the 
water-resource sector and its funding of dams. To be effective, and to gain 
formal audience, they must have local allies. 
 Yet almost all Lesotho NGOs have withdrawn their criticisms of the 
Lesotho project. So did the South African civics, including Alexandra, after 
visiting and discussing with the people affected, and not "intimidation", which 
is claimed in the article. 
 We have sympathy for the difficulty some international critics face, 
particularly now as World Bank executive directors were about to visit South 
Africa to review, among other things, the Lesotho project. 
 We suggest the real authors stand up and put their case in person. 
Your readers may as well escape being given the impression -- complete with 
editor's note that "identities are known to the Mail & Guardian" -- that we live 
in the Stoffel Botha days, when blank spaces and withheld names were the only 
way to tell the story. 
 There are, of course, substantive matters of debate around the Lesotho 
Highlands Project and its possible future phases. These large dam projects are 
essentially insurance against the risk of drought. Had the predicted El 
Nino-induced drought materialised as it did elsewhere, Gauteng and 
surrounding provinces would have faced a choice between severe water 
restrictions and the dam. 
 At current levels of development, our experience is that, in a severe 
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conservation, however well-run our national conservation programme is - and 
we appreciate the back-handed compliment for this programme in the 
anonymous article. 
 The hardship of drought falls on economic activity as well as on 
householders and imposes huge costs on the economy. So we believe the 
majority of residents would have opted for the first dam, Katse, and the 
assurance it provides. Phase 1A was ready just in time to avert the risk of 
economic shutdown. We face similar choices over Phase 1B, which is now 
under way and is not reversible without massive cost. 
 Planning is an imprecise science, particularly during the sort of political 
and economic transition South Africa is traversing. We would be irresponsible 
to plan for a stagnant economy, with no growth in incomes and jobs. We have 
rather chosen to plan for a better South Africa, specifically for a growing and 
prosperous regional economy. 
 We accept the responsibility to help to ensure that unacceptable 
environmental degradation and social disruption do not result from this project, 
which is constantly under review. It has been made more environment-friendly 
and people-friendly. Although the treaty ensures people should not be worse 
off after construction, we are committed to ensuring they are better off. 
 We agree the Phase 1B project could have been delayed for a year or 
two. That would have lost the effective "continuity bonus" (worth at least 
R600-million) that we have gained by using capacity established for Phase 1A. 
In taking this decision, we are also guided by the policy consensus that it is 
helpful to the regional economy during the present phase to maintain current 
levels of domestic fixed investment. 
 Water tariffs to consumers and management of distribution networks 
in Alexandra and in the Johannesburg area generally are the responsibility of 
Johannesburg's local government. So we hope the critics will take the debate 
into the forums that have the power to act. Specifically, we would like to know 
whether they are using the opportunities opened to them by the Water Services 
Act to intervene at local level. 
 To our knowledge, this is not happening in any structured way. In 
terms, for instance, of our policy of promoting block tariffs, Alexandra 
residents without full household services or making relatively low use of water 
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should not have to pay the marginal cost of new water supplies. If they are 
being asked to do so, it is at local government level that inquiries should be 
directed, and we would be happy to help them to do this. 
 Neither the national department nor Rand Water has the power to 
compel any local authority to use water made available by the Lesotho scheme. 
What we expect is that the high cost of "new water" will provide new incentives 
for local government to reduce "unaccounted-for water". The department and 
Rand Water have initiated schemes to help them do this. 
 We invite your readers to join us in the difficult but exciting task of 
implementing a new water policy that will build a fair society and allow South 
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V. The World Bank Response (2): 
"Response to the Alleged Violations" 
 
DATE:  June 17, 1998 
FROM:  James D. Wolfensohn, President 
 
1. ... The Chairman of the Inspection Panel requested the Bank Management to 
provide the Panel with written evidence that it has complied, or intends to 
comply, with the relevant policies and procedures in the implementation of the 
Project referenced above... 
 
I. Violation of consultation process as required under OD 4.00 Annex B, 
paragraph 19 
 
4. The Requesters have alleged that "as consumers and citizens who will have to 
pay for the Project" they have not been "adequately consulted at any stage of 
this project"... 
 
5. In the Management's opinion, this allegation has no merit... The residents of 
Alexandra and Soweto townships represent only a small fraction of consumers 
who will benefit from the water purchased by South Africa for use in its 
territory... the Project does not impose directly any disproportionate burden to 
the residents of Alexandra and Soweto townships... 
 
6. Management is of the opinion that the requirements ... could not reasonably 
require the Borrower under the Project to consider that all the  ultimate 
consumers of a commodity (i.e. water) harnessed under the Project (including 
those residing in a third country) should be treated as affected by the Project... 
 
7. ... it is Management's view that OD 4.00 does not require as a matter of 
policy or of procedure that all consumers of a commodity to be produced as a 
result of a Bank-financed project, and particularly those residing in a third 
country, be included in the consultation process... 
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II. Violation of consideration of project design alternatives as required 
under OD 4.00 Annex B, paragraph 5 
 
9. The Requesters allege in paragraph 5.3 that "the Bank has not fully 
investigated demand-side management options during the planning of either 
phase of the LHWP"... 
 
12. Demand-side management is a technique which has been developed over 
time. It should be noted that when the Treaty was concluded in 1986, demand-
side management techniques were not yet fully developed anywhere in the 
world... 
 
13. In this connection, the Borrower and the South African water authorities 
have analyzed the Vaal River Augmentation Planning Studies which consider 
demand management as an alternative to the subsequent phases of LHWP 
beyond Phases 1A and 1B... These analyses have concluded that it would be 
more beneficial for Lesotho and South Africa to proceed with the 
implementation of the Phase 1B Project as currently scheduled. The Bank has 
reviewed these studies and has found them satisfactory... 
 
III. Failure to carry out economic evaluation of alternatives as required 
under OD 10.04 
 
16. The Requesters' assertions that "there has been little or no analysis of how 
Phase 1A and Phase 1B will affect Rand Water and its end users" ... Regarding 
the Phase 1B Project, it should be noted that a comprehensive economic 
assessment of the Project economics (including the alternative of demand 
management and an analysis of the economics of delaying Phase 1B) was 
carried out by the Borrower and the South African authorities; this study was 
updated in April 1998. The Bank has evaluated this assessment as part of its 
appraisal of the Project and has found the analysis and its conclusions 
satisfactory... 
 
17. The Requesters also assert that the sustainability of the Phase 1B Project 
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on the Orange River. The Bank has reviewed and discussed with the South 
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rld Development Report 1994, though they were rejected by Project, "water 
costs will increase by 9% this year, following a 30% increase last year; this will 
hurt the poor particularly since the additional supply is not needed at his time." 
They further claim that the Project will create a disincentive for water 
conservation. In Management's view, this assertion has no merit. The bulk 
water price increases experienced to date result from water shortages suffered 
by the Gauteng region in the 1980s. According to the law of supply and 
demand, water price increases could have been even higher if Phase 1A of 
LHWP had not been constructed. 
 
19. Also, it should be noted that since Rand Water pays a variable rate (i.e. a set 
rate per cubic meter consumed and not a fixed annual "take or pay" rate) for 
the water they consume, and since they pass these costs on to consumers in the 
same form, the project will not create a substantial disincentive for demand 
management... if Phase 1B is pursued on schedule and demand management is 
implemented -- then bulk water prices will not be further increased as a result 
of the execution of the Phase 1B Project... 
 
20. ... Management is of the opinion that the bulk water pricing policy 
employed by South Africa provides for an acceptable combination of cost 
recovery and better allocation of resources (falling just under the long run 
marginal cost)... 
 
V. Failure to promote poverty reduction measures as required under OD 
4.15 
 
21. The Requesters are asserting that the Phase 1B Project "will create under 
burdens on low-income people, not only on project-affected people in Lesotho, 
but in Gauteng Province because of increases in water prices." In 
Management's view, this claim is without merit. This is because Management is 
satisfied that a central aspect of the Project is its poverty related dimension 
which is anchored in the Lesotho Country Assistance Strategy... 
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VI. The World Bank 
Inspection Panel Findings: 
"Panel Report and Recommendation" 
 
DATE:  August 18, 1998 
FROM:  Ernst-Guenther Groeder, Chairman, Inspection Panel 
 
13. This report is based on the Request, the Response, additional information 
provided by the Requesters and Bank Management, the RSA, and individual 
Bank Executive Directors who recently visited South Africa and Lesotho... 
 
The Question of Demand-Side Management 
 
61. Based on the field visit, it is evident why Bank Management in its Response 
states that it was satisfied that the Government of South Africa has adequately 
considered demand-side management alternatives in relation to the decision to 
proceed with Phase 1B... 
 
63. During the field visit, the Inspector found general agreement that these 
policies and programs have enjoyed a considerable initial success. Estimates of 
the potential of these programs to reduce water demand in the Vaal River 
System Supply Area vary greatly but they are all significant... 
 
65. The Requesters also claim that officials in the townships have failed to take 
demand-side management seriously, arguing that it is only now that attempts to 
address faulty, apartheid-era infrastructure are being made. The Panel did not 
consider this because it does not relate to Bank Management acts or omissions 
in compliance or non-compliance with the OD. 
 
66. However, during the field visit it became apparent that Gauteng 
municipalities are not yet in the forefront of demand-side management efforts 
but the need and potential are recognized. As the Requesters claim, it was 
evident that the poorer townships, including Alexandra and Soweto, suffer 
huge water losses through broken mains, ruptured pipes, leaky communal, yard 
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Rand Water and the municipal utilities stated that the financial implications of 
these losses are huge and disturbing. 
 
67. In October 1995, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry published 
a "Vaal Augmentation Planning Study" in which it assessed water demand 
management in the Vaal Rivers System Supply Area. The Bank reviewed this 
study and found it satisfactory. One may legitimately argue about the merits of 
the report, but its existence clearly demonstrates that demand-side management 
was "considered" as required by the OD. 
 
68. During the field visit, the reports that the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry is working with Rand Water on a comprehensive demand-side 
management study for the Vaal River System Supply Area were confirmed. The 
study is expected to be completed in 1999. It will be used to assess options for 
the future, including whether and when future phases of LHWP may be 
needed. 
 
69. In light of the above, the Panel is satisfied that Bank Management appears 
to have "considered" demand management as required by the OD... 
 
The Cost Recovery and Price Link 
 
74. In discussions with senior officials from TransCaledon Tunnel Authority 
(TCTA), DWAF, Rand Water and the municipalities of Alexandra and Soweto, 
the Inspector was informed that water prices have risen at all levels. These 
increases are a consequence of a number of factors, one of which is the LHWP. 
The relationships and linkages between these factors, however, are anything but 
direct; in fact, they are long, complex and tenuous. 
 
75. Prices are levied at various points in a chain leading from the source to the 
end user. Thus DWAF collects raw water from various sources in the Vaal 
System, one of which is LHWP... It sells water to Rand Water at a bulk tariff. It 
also sells water to other large consumers at the same bulk tariff. Rand Water in 
turn wholesales water to the municipalities in Gauteng at a bulk price. And the 
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municipalities in their turn retail water to end users at a variable price. 
 
76. Water from the LHWP enters this complex system upstream, at the point 
where the Ash River discharges into the Vaal. At that point, the TCTA, which 
is responsible for bearing all project costs and servicing the project debt, sells 
project water to DWAF at a bulk rate set to enable it to discharge the debt over 
a period of years (cost recovery). It is true, as Management states, that Rand 
Water pays a set rate per cubic meter consumed (i.e. if it doesn't take it doesn't 
pay). But this may not have any significance in practice. The fact is that TCTA 
and DWAF must recover the full costs of the project. If Rand Water does not 
take the volume of water on which the rates are calculated for a period of time, 
the rates will be adjusted upwards to produce the necessary revenue for full 
cost recovery. Or, alternatively, the debt repayment period may be extended. 
 
77. Since April 1994, the bulk water tariff that TCTA charges DWAF has 
slightly more than tripled, rising from R0.242/Kl to R0.751/Kl. During the 
same period, April 1994 to April 1998, the tariff that DWAF charges its large 
consumers, including Rand Water, has slightly more than doubled, rising from 
R0.457/Kl to R0.945/Kl. This of course includes the amount that DWAF pays 
to TCTA for LHWP water. 
 
78. The last increase levied by TCTA occurred in April 1998 and, contrary to 
the concerns reflected in the claim, both TCTA and DWAF stated that they 
foresee no further increases as a result of 1B. In other words, TCTA anticipates 
that the prices now in place at the point where it sells to DWAF should enable 
it to fully retire the debt for Phase 1, including both 1A and 1B. 
 
79. Rand Water's charges to the municipalities have also increased during this 
period. From April 1994 to April 1998, the bulk water tariff that Rand Water 
charges the municipalities increased by slightly less than half, rising from 
R1.201/Kl to R1.685/Kl. 
 
80. How have the municipalities responded? At this point the linkages back to 
LHWP become very tenuous. At the municipal retail level in Gauteng, a host of 
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possible to isolate one factor against the others. 
 
81. In July 1995, the Inspector was informed that progressive block rates were 
introduced for meter use, with charges rising in four steps according to use. In 
the cases, for example, of Sandton, which is the richest community in Gauteng, 
and Alexandra, which includes some of the poorest in the province, the first 
step charge for the smallest users (up to 10 Kl) is R1.85/Kl; the fourth step 
charge for the largest users (above 40Kl) is R4.80/Kl. 
 
82. Obviously, block rates can only apply where there is the capacity to meter 
use. Only 20% of poor people have metered water and they are not the poorest 
of the poor. The other 80% access communal facilities. 
 
83. In Alexandra and Soweto, the poor are largely dependent on communal 
standpipes, not metered facilities. In these cases, there is a lower rate. It is a flat 
rate which is applied to each house in the environs of a standpipe. This flat rate 
is currently R18.15 (about $3.00) per month. It too has increased somewhat. In 
July, 1996, it stood at R16.26 per month. This is viewed as a lifeline rate, even 
by some of the NGOs. Again, this is contrary to assertions made in the claim 
concerning the "lack of lifeline tariffs." 
 
84. Indeed, the Government of South Africa and the DWAF actively support 
the adoption of lifeline tariff systems to ensure that every person has at least a 
basic level of service. Rand Water made it clear that they too support lifeline 
tariff systems, as do the municipalities. 
 
85. During a field visit, the Inspector encountered a wide range of views 
concerning lifeline rates amongst NGOs and the poor users he spoke to at the 
standpipes. Some NGO leaders favor a lifeline rate of zero for the first 25-50 
liters per day. Some are prepared to accept a real charge but would like to see it 
kept as low as possible. This is local debate. Whatever the level, in principle the 
effect of these lifeline rates are to shield the very poor from most if not all of 
any extra burden imposed by the LHWP. 
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86. The Requesters assert that many hundreds of poor people simply cannot 
pay even these low lifeline rates and are being cut off for non-payment. 
Officials from Rand Water and the municipalities stated that, indeed, many 
people are being cut off for non-payment. They also stated that non-payment is 
a widespread phenomenon in South Africa. It is not limited to water services 
and it is not necessarily tied to income or ability to pay. Non-payment for 
services began as a strategy in the struggle against apartheid. It has continued as 
a habit of non-payment if not a culture of entitlement. It is found not only in 
the poorer parts of Alexandra, Soweto and other townships, but also in the 
more well-to-do parts of those communities. It also affects residents of other 
communities, some of them very well-to-do, and even elected leaders and 
government agencies. Non-payment may result from other factors, including 
the costs of payment (time of travel to collection offices) and other institutional 
barriers. The Inspector was informed that the Government of South Africa, 
DWAF, Rand Water and the municipalities have taken a firm position on 
payment for services, including water and sanitation services. Failure to pay is 
resulting in cut-offs. Given the many factors at play, however, it is clearly 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to determine the extent to which non-payment 
and hence cut-offs stem from this habit of non-payment or from a simple 




87. As noted, Rand Water pays a set rate per cubic meter consumed (i.e. if it 
doesn't take it doesn't pay). Since TCTA and DWAF must recover the full costs 
of the project, if Rand Water does not take for a period of time, TCTA and 
DWAF stated that the rates may be adjusted upwards to produce the necessary 
revenue for full cost recovery. Or, alternatively, the debt repayment period 
could be extended. If the former, the higher rates would normally be passed on 
to consumers. In principal, higher water rates should encourage conservation. 
At the same time, if the lifeline rates are undisturbed, this should not place an 
extra burden on the poor. 
 
88. On the basis of the foregoing preliminary assessment, Bank Management 
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that is socially equitable while assisting it in aiming for both cost recovery and 
conservation. In light of this, the Panel finds that the Bank appears to have 




90. The Requesters claim that Phase 1B "will create undue burdens on low-
income poeple... in Gauteng province, where ... water rates have already risen 
dramatically due to LHWP and are expected to rise further as the LHWP bills 
begin to rise." They further believe that rather than udnertake a costly 
infrastructure project before actually needed, the poor would be better served 
"by changes in water allocation, repair of leaky infrastructure, a daily lifeline 
amount of water... and other approaches." 
 
91. The Management Response addresses compliance with this policy only in 
terms of Lesotho, not South Africa. However, with respect to meeting the 
needs ofpoor water consumers in South Africa, it states that:  "any 
postponement of the Phase B Project would carry net economic and financial 
costs to South Africa and hence would more likely harm than help poor water 
consumers"... While insisting that these challenges "are not related to the 
LHWP," Management states that it "remains committed to pursuing a 
constructive policy dialogue with the relevant South African authoriteis with 
regard to South Africa's policies applicable to its retail water sector"... 
 
93. At the same time, there is an increasingly severe lack of funding for 
addressing retail water delivery problems at the municipal level... In spite of 
this, South Africa is making impressive strides. For example, during the field 
visit it was learned that since 1995 nearly 3 million standpipes have been 
installed... 
 
95. As noted, paragraph 28 requires the Bank to "encourage the authorities to 
elimiante policy and institutional biases against the poor." This is hardly needed 
in the context of the unique case of post-apartheid South Africa obviously 
committed to redressing past biases... 
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97. Since the RSA Country Assistance Strategy is not yet available, the Panel is 
unable to comment on whether the overall investment portfolio would 
compliment this particular project in terms of poverty reduction. Staff have 
indicated that the Bank is ready to consider a request from South Africa for 
financial assistance targeted at addressing the challenge of catching up on the 
huge inequitable legacy of the apartheid era:  providing universal access to 
water, fixing the existing lack of infrastructure, etc. This is the harm the 
Requesters complain of. It is well recognized. However, it neither stems from, 
nor should it be aggravated by, the decision to proceed with 1B. 
 
98. On the basis of this preliminary assessment, it would not therefore appear 
that the Bank has violated the letter of OD 4.15. 
 
Findings on Harm and Bank's Observance of its Policies  
 
99. There is no doubt, as the Requesters claim, that for reasons of historical 
neglect poor communities suffer widespread inequities in terms of lack of or 
limited access to water. This imposes enormous hardships, especially on people 
dependent on communal access, who have to carry water in buckets and 
makeshift containers, often for great distances. Water prices have increased and 
some are unable to afford water sufficient for basic health and hygiene. Leaky 
infrastructure is causing severe wastage and health problems. Conditions are 
harsh and unsanitary for millions of people in Alexandra, Soweto and other 
poorer townships. But the Panel is not satisfied that there is prima facie 
evidence linking this situation to the Project, nor with the Bank's decision to 
proceed with financing 1B. 
 
100. The Requesters' concerns about the conditions on the ground are valid but 
there does not appear to be a connection between these conditions and any 
observance or not by the Bank of its own policies and procedures. Rather, they 
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101. In this context, the Panel recommends that the Executive Directors do not 
authorize an investigation into this Request for inspection. 
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VII.  Conclusion 
 
The documents above -- about half of which represent critical citizen advocacy, 
the other half official consideration (and ameliorative rebuttal) of that advocacy 
-- provide fertile ground for case study, in several respects:  the socio-economic, 
ecological and political context for an extremely expensive water transfer 
scheme; technical aspects of cost-benefit analysis; and the discursive tactics of 
the different roleplayers. This conclusion addresses all three aspects 
simultaneously, for together they compel us to raise concerns about the scope 
of reforms that can be made to the existing system, versus how urgently a more 
comprehensive, indeed revolutionary, transformation is required. 
 We don't purport to be able to offer a decisive, systematic conclusion, 
because much of the argumentation laid out in the preceding pages is based on 
hypothetical aspects of public policy -- whether TCTA and DWAF will increase 
bulk prices, whether lifeline and block tariffs will be applied, whether demand-
side management will be intensified -- and on the weather (the drought factor), 
which are yet to play themselves out. Only after a few years should it be 
possible to look back upon this case study in order to determine which 
arguments had merit, and whether or not Alexandra residents' fears of socio-
economic and ecological harm from Phase 1B and status quo delivery policies 
were indeed warranted. 
 Before considering a summary of the arguments, however, there were, 
in these documents (particularly the Panel findings), a few areas where matters 
of fact came under dispute. But these were relatively minor, and need not 
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ðe perennial shortages of water in South Africa and the 
threat of drought, should demand-side management be given much higher priority 
than at present by DWAF, water boards and municipalities -- both on 
redistributive and conservation grounds? 
 
 • given not only that township infrastructure is continually plagued by 
systemic physical failure -- and given, too, the fact that of three million 
(mainly rural) households who have benefitted from taps installed 
within 1/2 km of their residence since 1994 an estimated 90% now no 
longer have access to water due to systemic breakdown based often on 
lack of affordability -- should DWAF, water boards and municipalities use 
their resources to improve installation and maintenance on a more generously 
subsidised basis? 
 
 • given that "lifeline" rates may be unaffordable for the poorest urban 
and rural residents, should both national, water board and municipal government 
policy shift to more decisively commit to defining lifeline as "free"? 
 
 • given that from 1994 to 1998, LHWP bulk water prices trebled due 
to dam construction costs, DWAF bulk prices to Rand Water likewise 
doubled, and Rand Water prices to Gauteng municipalities rose by 
40% (with low-income Johannesburg residents facing a 55% increase 
in the price of the first block of water from July 1995 to July 1998), 
and given that many municipalities continue to suffer severe fiscal 
crisis, should urgent steps be taken to ensure that bulk water prices are frozen (as 
is promised, probably unreliably, by the TCTA and DWAF) and, most 
importantly, that Rand Water desists from cutting off water services to entire towns 
and that municipalities desist from engaging in mass water cut-offs to large sections 
of townships (as often happens even when individual households pay their bills)? 
 
All the above questions can be addressed along a spectrum ranging from 
relative comfort with existing progress (as Bank, Inspection Panel and South 
African Government officials all recorded) to impatience that change and social 
justice are not happening faster. Thabo Mbeki has addressed this problem in 
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 Our answer to the question whether we are making that 
requisite progress towards achieving the objective of nation-
building, as we defined it, would be:  No! 
  A major component part of the issue of 
reconciliation and nation-building is defined by and derives 
from the material conditions in our society which have 
divided our country into two nations, the one black and the 
other white... 
  What this throws up, inevitably, is the question:  Are 
the relatively rich who as a result of an apartheid definition are 
white, prepared to help underwrite the upliftment of the poor, 
who as a result of an apartheid definition are black? 
 
It could be argued, of course, that with requisite political will along these lines, 
reforms to South Africa's water sector are possible within the framework of 
existing arrangements, through redistributive payment mechanisms and more 
aggressive demand-side management. But the balance of social forces within 
South Africa (and indeed, ultimately, in relation to the international financial 
community) illustrated in the relative comfort the various officials report with 
status quo processes, gives pause for concern. 
 An even greater set of challenges remains, however. Beyond those 
features of the LHWP debate that could potentially be resolved by firmer 
political will and more rigorous technical support (rather than the existing 
bureaucratic acquiescence or even occasional sabotage of redistributive 
measures), are more serious obstacles to progress that must also be raised. Here 
we encounter the most important discursive problem, namely how to inject 
larger issues of socio-economic and environmental justice into what, above, are reduced, 
again and again, to essentially technical debates over the pace of what David 
Harvey has termed "ecological modernisation." 
 Instead, argues Harvey, what is vitally needed to augment and indeed 
supersede such technicist discourse is "the articulation of ideas about a moral 
economy of collective provision and collective responsibility as opposed to a 
set of distributive relations within the political economy of profit." At first this 
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is startling, but the very inability of the Bank Inspection Panel's technocrats to 
look beyond the parameters of orthodox "sustainable development" -- i.e., 
sustainable for capital accumulation (in this case a 16% return on investment) -- 
suggests some merits to posing the issue of bulk water for Gauteng much more 
in terms of collective provision and collective responsibility, which would be at 
the very least consistent with South Africa's Bill of Rights. At least four more 
questions now arise (in no particular order of importance): 
 
 • Given that, as Bank Management posit, Lesotho would be 
substantially hurt in the short-term by any delay in Phase 1B, should a 
democratic South Africa face up to its historic responsibilities for righting socio-
economic and environmental wrongs associated with having taken advantage of 
Lesotho's neo-colonial, dependent status for so long? 
 
 • Given the (predictable) potential for periodic droughts and the 
intrinsic problem of water scarcity in Gauteng -- which after all exists 
in its present form as the country's key metropolis not only because of 
the 1910 decision to locate the Union of South Africa's capital in 
Pretoria, but mainly because in 1886 extremely rich gold seams were 
discovered in what is now Johannesburg -- should further industrial, 
commercial and residential growth, requiring large increases in water supply in the 
absence of more serious demand-side management, be encouraged or indeed be 
allowed? 
 
 • At a more technical but nevertheless radical level, given the many 
failings of World Bank staff (as documented above), and given the 
declining value of the rand and the low import-content in basic 
infrastructure provision (especially water pipes and taps, which are 
locally produced), should the Bank be in the business of financing, with hard 
currency, water projects (such as the suggested "request from South Africa for 
financial assistance targeted at addressing the challenge of catching up on the huge 
inequitable legacy of the apartheid era") when such projects can be financed through 
local currency credits and tax revenues? 
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fact that the Inspection Panel simply failed to address the issues of 
inappropriate Bank policy-advisory interventions and, too, ultimately 
unveiled the strictly delimited (and merely credibility-enhancing) role of 
"consultation" about the consumption of LHWP water, should social 
movements, NGOs and other progressives consider adopting a formal boycott 
position against the Bank? 
 
With the $45 million Phase 1B loan approved by the Bank Executive Directors 
in June (well before the Panel made its finding), let us remain, in conclusion, at 
the level of progressive grassroots resistance to the ideas, projects and funding 
of the World Bank and its allies. For Alexandra residents and other advocates 
of social change, there are a variety of other lessons to consider from tangential 
issues associated with contesting the World Bank's role in the LHWP 
expansion. 
 Some lessons are political, such as how to contend with South African 
government intimidation (see footnote 1). Some lessons potentially relate to 
strengthening civil society internationalism, particularly so that grassroots 
organisations and NGOs can work better across borders (as Lesotho's 
Highlands Church Action Group and some Johannesburg NGOs nearly 
achieved before Lesotho's NGOs endorsed Phase 1B in early 1998). Some 
lessons relate to the merits (questionable, it seems) of taking the Bank's 
equivalent of an "auditor-general" seriously, given its various problematic 
findings, as discussed above. And some are associated with the construction of 
a hegemonic discourse, which to illustrate from the pages of Business Day, 
entailed, on the one hand, that paper's endorsement of the anti-expansion 
position by the environment reporter, but on the other hand was countered by 
a series of pro-Bank, explicitly anti-community articles by its eloquent 
Washington correspondent. 
 It may be worth drawing out, as a denouement, the challenges for not 
just the Alexandra Civic Organisation -- which in December 1998 publicly 
recommitted itself to opposing the financial and service delivery implications of 
LHWP expansion -- but more generally for community residents who will, as 
the Alexandra residents predict, pay the bills for yet another unnecessary 
megaproject. Recall that the Alexandra residents identified the following four 
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problems which they associated, to at least some extent, with LHWP Phase 1B: 
 rising water prices; less incentive to instigate demand-side management 
measures; increased fiscal stress on municipalities and hence faster water cut-
offs; and fewer resources for the capital and recurrent subsidies required to 
improve and construct water supply infrastructure appropriate for low-income 
communities. 
 If the democratically-elected African National Congress government 
cannot address these very real problems in a manner more convincingly than 
have Minister Asmal, Director-General Muller, Bank President Wolfensohn, 
LHWP Taskmanager Roome and Panel Investigator MacNeill, they may 
encounter -- if not in 1999 then in 2004 -- a serious electoral challenge, or 
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ENDNOTES  
 . Anonymity was requested by the three Alexandra residents for the reason that in the 
wake of filing an initial draft Inspection Panel Request (on 3 March 1998) on behalf of the 
Soweto and Alexandra Civic Organisations, intense pressure was brought to bear by the 
government to withdraw the initial claim, which leaders of the two civics did on 20 April. 
Three residents -- including Letsie -- disagreed and pursued the claim (with voluntary 
technical support from Bond and several other researchers). By December 1998 the 
Alexandra Civic Organisation had formally reversed its position and reestablished its 
support for the arguments contained in the April 23 document. 
 
. This first section was a joint product of work done by the two lead authors, two additional 
residents of Alexandra, and several technical experts associated with the Development 
Research Institute (Johannesburg), Alternative Information and Development Centre (Cape 
Town, http:\\www.aidc.org), Group for Environmental Monitoring (Johannesburg), 
International Rivers Network (http:\\www.irn.org), and Center for International 
Environmental Law (http:\\www.ciel.org). The document has been edited for brevity, leaving 
out several aspects of the process of public participation in the LHWP project, as well as 
the request for anonymity. The only change is the replacement, for the sake of consistency, 
of the word "Request" for the original "Claim." 
 
. By John Roome, LHWP Task Manager; original version referred to in the Request above 
was dated March 1998; all footnotes and tables below are as in the 24 April document. 
Much of the documentation associated with the $54 million World Bank loan for Phase 1B 
can be found in World Bank (1998), Lesotho:  Lesotho Highlands Water Project -- Phase 
1B:  Project Appraisal Document, (17727-LSO), R98-106(PAD), Water and Urban 1, Africa 
Region, Washington, DC, April 30. (Notably, "This document has a restricted distribution 
and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents 
may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.") 
 
. This note summarizes a more extensive discussion of the economic assessment of 
Phase 1B which was produced by LHDA with inputs provided by the World Bank and the 
South African Department of Water Affairs. The updated April, 1998 version of the full 
document ("The Economics of Phase 1B") is available in the project file. 
 
 . The extent of these possible restrictions is being investigated by RSA in the context of 
the Orange River Replanning Study. While most of the losses of the transferred water may 
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be made up by releases from reservoir in the lower Orange, this may not be possible in a 
string of exceptionally dry years. It should also be pointed out that using water for irrigation 
has the lowest economic value and may in any case be reduced as South Africa is 
amending its water laws and water tariffs that will likely reallocate water away from irrigation 
to more productive household, commercial, and industrial uses. See also footnote 6. 
 
. For most of the analysis, the environmental and social costs and benefits are not 
considered as they are assumed to balance each other. It is argued here and elsewhere 
that this assumption biases the analysis against Phase 1B since the benefits of the 
spending are expected to be larger than the losses incurred. The benefits of increased 
economic activity and the permanent infrastructure is also not included in the assessment. 
It presents additional benefits that are enumerated in the context of the benefits to Lesotho 
(see below). 
 
 . Raising the water price is one important (of several) elements of a demand management 
strategy so that the assessment of demand management policies and the price-based 
consumer surplus analysis are not entirely independent. 
 
. As the analysis assumes that the water will not be needed until 2010, price increases in 
the without Phase 1B scenario will only start in that year. In the with Phase 1B scenario, 
they will not start until 2014 when demand is expected to outstrip available supply including 
Phase 1B. 
 
. The worst-case assumption used was to assume that every m3 of water diverted to 
Gauteng will lead to the same reduction of water available for irrigation in the lower Orange 
(which is only likely to be partially true in exceptionally dry years). The calculations, based 
on the Vaal Augmentation Planning Study, show that every m3 of water used for irrigation 
generates about R 0.61 in agricultural surplus. This is much less than the value generated 
by the water for urban, industrial, commercial, and household use so that it has only a 
modest impact on the rate of return (reducing it by about 1.5%). 
 
. In this context, it should be noted that the royalties are not determined based on the 
absolute benefits of the project. Instead, they are based on the cost difference between 
implemented the project in Lesotho and implementing the project in South Africa (via the 
Orange Vaal Transfer Scheme, OVTS). Under the treaty, Lesotho is entitled to 56% of the 
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scarcity and high economic value of water in the Gauteng region, however, South Africa will 
realize very high absolute benefits from the water transfer (regardless of whether it the 
project is implemented in Lesotho or via the OVTS). 
 
. The TVTS calculation are based on a pre-feasibility study. Between pre-feasibility and 
implementation, costs often increase considerably. In the 1970s, a small transfer scheme 
from the Tugela to the Vaal was developed as a complement to a pump storage scheme in 
the Drakensberg, when 11m3/s water was transferred whenever energy demand was low. 
In 1985, low energy demand allowed the transfer to be increased to 20m3/s. In 1994, it was 
determined that up to 35m3/s could be transferred without increasing the capacity at the 
pump storage scheme which therefore drastically reduces the costs of the TVTS 
alternative. 
 
. In addition, attempts to restrict the movement of people and industries (or worse, 
attempts to move people to other regions) are unlikely to be politically acceptable in South 
Africa where forced removals of people were common during the apartheid era. 
 
. If South Africa cancels Phase 2 and beyond unilaterally, then it will still have to pay the 
full fixed royalties plus the variable royalties associated with Phase 1A and Phase 1B. If 
Phase 2 and beyond are canceled by mutual consent, then South Africa only has to pay the 
portion of the fixed royalties associated with the investment cost savings of implementing 
Phase 1 in Lesotho, plus the variable royalties associated with Phase 1A and Phase 1B. 
 
. Water Affairs and Forestry Minister Kader Asmal and his Director-General, Mike Muller, 
here reply to an article by the Alexandra residents in the Mail and Guardian, which, in 
summarising the Inspection Panel Request, began with an oblique reference to what was 
then considered the necessary step of safeguarding the three residents' identities, in view 
of documented intimidation against an earlier group of Phase 1B opponents from Soweto 
and Alexandra. This was the longest South African government public document 
responding to community concerns about Phase 1B. 
 
. This document, though under Bank President Wolfensohn's signature, was reportedly 
drafted by Roome. The document begins (sections 2 through 9) by questioning the eligibility 
of the Alexandra residents in part upon grounds -- or rather, in the Inspection Panel's 
words, a "most odd conclusion" -- that South African water consumption issues were not 
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relevant (paragraph 30 of Inspection Panel Findings). The eligibility challenge was firmly 
rejected by the Panel and is hence dispensed with here. The edited document below 


























 this assessment as part of its appraisal of the Project and has found the 





t the Project may have on the Orange River. The 
Bank has reviewed and discussed with the South African authorities their "Orangeank's 
Pretoria staff and Washington, DC managemen. The Bank's Pretoria office displayed "an 
unprecedented disregard" for procedures by revealing the claimants' names in public 
documentation. Later, management "discussed and dismissed the allegations in the 
Request in presentations to the Executive Directors, and it did so on three separate 
occasions" (30 April in the Project Appraisal Document and at Board meetings on 21 May 
and 4 June, i.e., before the 18 August Inspection Panel report)... "apart from ignoring the 
Panel's procedures, this would also appear to amount to a serious abuse of reasonable due 
process in any context" (paragraphs 23-26). Moreover, regarding Wolfensohn's 16 June 
letter, "The Response does not provide the substantive information required by the 
Resolution... The Panel, of course, rejected Management's refusal to respond in the proper 
way, and so informed the President of the Bank... the Panel had decided nevertheless to go 
ahead and treat the information provided in the Annex as the substantive Management 
Response" (paragraphs 28-31). On the matter of consultation between Bank staff and 
affected groups, the Panel found it "odd that Management should argue that the 
Operational Directive does not require them to undertake such consultations and they did 
not respond to request to meet with local community residents... The NGOs appear to have 
brought their concerns to the Bank's attention. By its own admission, the Bank 
Management failed to observe the policy on consultation until shortly before April 30, 1998" 
(paragraphs 52-57). 
 
. More analysis which supports this conclusion can be found in Bond, P. (1999), "The 
Economics of Dam Building and the Brown Agenda:  Contesting the Impact of the Lesotho 
Highlands Water Project on Johannesburg," in D.MacDonald (Ed), Environmental Justice in 
South Africa, Cape Town, Oxford University Press. 
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briefly. For example, the opportunity cost of funds is crucial to the argument about whether 
or not it makes sense to delay Phase 1B, and while the Bank consistently based its 
argument on a 5% or 6% discount rate, it could easily be argued (and in another 1997 
LHWP cost assessment it was indeed argued) that consistent with World Bank practice, a 
10% discount rate should be used, which in turn would have led more easily to a decision 
to delay Phase 1B (the real rate of interest on South African and Lesotho government 
bonds in mid-1998 was far higher than 10%). Moreover, the difference between the April 
1998 Bank Phase 1B economic analysis, in the wake of the Alexandra residents' critique, 
and the Bank's earlier, probably more honest November 1997 analysis (when the Bank did 
not expect a formal Inspection Challenge), is telling. Most importantly, the net cost of 
delaying Phase 1B has gone up by a factor of three for the period 1997-2000 and by a 
factor of 18 for beyond 2004. (This is partly a result of added capital and administrative 
costs associated with the delay, but these costs are not clarified and appear excessively 
high.) The cost-benefit analysis does not include benefits of delay, such as retaining the 
Phase 1B land that will be submerged as agricultural land; retaining water in the Orange 
River catchment for use downstream; and applying demand-side management techniques 
such as fixing broken infrastructure in Gauteng. This latter point is especially important in 
that the Bank (inappropriately) compares LHWP Phases 1A and 1B with the costs of 
imposing supply alternatives, namely the Tugela Vaal Transfer Scheme and the Orange 
Vaal Transfer Scheme (Table 3), which again begs the question of savings (of an estimated 
40%) potentially achievable through demand-side management. Moreover, the Bank 
economic analysis suffered from inconsistency in its treatment of the one-year delay, the 
addition of administrative and maintenance costs to Phase 1B work, and the exclusion of 
hydropower and TVTS costs. 
 
. Matters of disputed fact (or semantics) with the Panel include the following: 
• in relation to Gauteng municipalities' failure to implement demand-side management 
measures, "The Panel did not consider this because it does not relate to Bank 
Management acts or omissions in compliance or non-compliance with the OD" (paragraph 
65), when in fact a reasonable interpretation of OD 4.00 (paragraph 5) ("Design of 
investment programs for supplying water or energy should consider demand 
management...") should justify an investigation of municipal use of (and conservation 
strategies related to) Bank-financed water, particularly given the well-documented bias in 
consumption patterns; 
• the Panel insists that "At the municipal retail level in Gauteng, a host of factors impact on 
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water charges, and on their collection, and it is simply not possible to isolate one factor 
against the others" (paragraph 80), when in fact even a moderately scientific (factor-
analysis) disaggregation of the effects of the vast increases in LHWP bulk water costs to 
downstream consumers is entirely feasible; 
• the Panel's finding that there are (very small) graduations in Johannesburg's block tariffs 
(rising by a factor of just four from lowest to highest consumption block) -- which "does not 
appear to bear out the assertions made by the Requesters concerning block rates" 
(paragraph 81) -- does not in the least contradict the Alexandra residents' insistence that if 
far greater progressivity in block rates were imposed (as the "Working for Water" 
programme has unsuccessfully proposed elsewhere, with 11-step rising tariffs) there would 
be far greater success in water conservation and redistribution; 
• the Panel calculated, inaccurately, that between 1995 and 1998, "the levy for the first step 
[in a Johannesburg water block tariff] increased from R1.20 to R1.85, or 35%" (paragraph 
81, footnote 20), when in fact (using R1.20 as the denominator) the increase was 55%, 
indicating that, relatively speaking, first-block consumers paid a higher proportion of the 
increase than did consumers who used more water; 
• the Panel's finding that "contrary to assertions made in the claim concerning the `lack of 
lifeline tariffs'" (paragraph 83) such tariffs do exist, implies a definition of "lifeline" adopted 
by the Panel that is not free of charge (a value judgment addressed below), rather than an 
incorrect assertion; 
• the Panel's concern over non-payment for services (paragraph 86) could be easily 
addressed by applying a universal (free) lifeline policy that would allow cut-offs (or trickle 
flow) after consumption of the first block, entirely consistent with a "culture of entitlement" 
(disparaged by the Panel) that in turn is entirely consistent with the South African 
Constitution's granting of rights to water in its Bill of Rights; and 
• DWAF oversaw the installation, from 1994-98, of (communal) rural water taps for 
approximately three million households (not three million taps, as the Inspection Panel had 
it, in paragraph 93), but reliable estimates from within DWAF suggest that 90% of the new 
taps no longer worked by the end of 1998. 
However, the Panel is to be commended for correcting Bank Management on the 
implications of Rand Water's variable pricing of water, arguing that "this may not have any 
significance in practice" given the need for full cost-recovery on the LHWP (paragraph 76). 
 
. In short, in a context in which South Africa remains one of the most unequal societies on 
earth (as measured by the Gini Coefficient, which is lower than only Brazil's), are the 
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change the distribution of water consumption? Those arguing for change point out the 
broader tendency in South Africa towards intensified wealth inequality and the rapid 
increase, since 1994, of water cut-offs against low-income households who have trouble 
paying rapidly-increasing municipal bills. The South African government has sent very 
mixed messages in this respect, belying the Panel's confidence in its redistributive 
intentions. Consider this comment from the Water Research Commission:  "Preliminary 
findings indicate a preference for prepayment and huge reductions in consumption of water 
and electricity (average 70%)" (Report to Parliament, 1997, p.18). Since the only 
prepayment experiments being conducted are in relation to low-income domestic users, 
this represents redistribution of water resources in the opposite direction desired, and a 
70% reduction from very low existing levels could be a dangerous threat to public health. 
 
. Those arguing for a far more aggressive approach to demand-side management 
(including greater credibility for wider-ranging conservation measures in LHWP feasibility 
studies) point to the existing lethargy in this area shown by powerful municipal officials 
(many inherited from the past and unwilling to radically alter consumption patterns of 
businesses or white residents); to the fragility of the "Working for Water" programme (e.g., 
its perennial struggle for funding from within DWAF, requiring outside funding sources); and 
to hostility against block tariffs regularly demonstrated not only by World Bank staff (as 
documented in the Request) but also by resistant municipal officials. For a telling example, 
see Bond, P. and S. Hosking (1999), "Infrastructure for Spatial Development Initiatives or 
for Basic Needs? Port Elizabeth's Prioritisation of the Coega Port/IDZ over Municipal 
Services," in M.Khosa and Y.Muthien (Eds), Infrastructure for Reconstruction in South 
Africa, Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council and London, Asgate Press. 
In contrast, in a private email memo on 23 April, 1998, the Bank's John Roome offered one 
rationale for not calculating demand-side management water (and economic) savings: 
And what do we gain from the demand studies? First, they will give an idea of what could 
be achieved -- they will NOT fully address the uncertainty of the ability of the local 
authorities to implement such programs, the speed with which SA consumption behavior 
will change and the political acceptability of more radical proposals eg. in agriculture. 
Second, even if the demand studies showed that a 20 year delay was technically viable -- 
the economics suggests that it would still not be a sensible thing to do. 
 
 . The relative savings would be enormous if leaks were repaired. But in addition, most 
pricing for water (even for the rural poor) is now based, as various post-1994 policy 
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documents insist, upon a cost-recovery system in which "lifeline" is defined as the 
"operating and maintenance" (or "recurrent") cost of running the system. Advocates for 
change argue that this is inappropriate given affordability constraints and past tariff systems 
for business and white residential consumers that entailed below-marginal cost pricing. 
 
. This dispute has many features, including the easy documentation of greater public 
health, ecological, economic and gender-equalising characteristics of free water. See Bond, 
P. (1999), "Basic Infrastructure for Socio-Economic Development, Ecological Sustainability 
and Geographical Desegregation:  South Africa's Unmet Challenge," Geoforum, 30, 1. 
 
. The shocking case of Leandra township, Mpumalanga, in which 70 000 residents served 
by Rand Water were cut off for several months, is illustrative of the dangers (see Sunday 
Independent's Reconstruct, 20 December 1998). 
 
. Mbeki, T. (1998), Africa:  The Time has Come, Cape Town, Tafelberg Publishers and 
Johannesburg, Mafube Publishing, pp.71-74. 
 
. Harvey, D. (1996), Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, p.389. 
 
. This is a matter the three Alexandra residents did not factor in to their advocacy, but as 
a first point of rebuttal, it is arguable that it is not in Lesotho's interests to have such an 
extraordinary boom-bust ingredient featuring so strongly in its GDP, based on what is 
acknowledged to be a temporary construction fillip and a sudden decline after the dams are 
built. The economic contribution of the LHWP is a particularly thorny issue because many 
of the beneficiaries of LHWP-related spending are Maseru-based elites, and because the 
well-publicised corruption in the Rural Development Fund forced the scaling back of water-
royalty flows to impoverished people due, ironically, to lack of "absorptive capacity." 
 Moreover, there were and are any number of development alternatives in Lesotho 
that could generate far better backward-forward linkages, job creation rates and other 
investment multpliers, as a former planning minister (Evaristus Sekhonyana) argued at the 
time of the original treaty (when he switched from supporting the LHWP to opposition):  
"We could achieve more if we irrigated agriculture and cut food imports" via schemes such 
as a $75 million power generation and irrigation project at Oxbow (Hanlon, J. [1987], 
Beggar Your Neighbours:  Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, London, Catholic Institute 
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numerous examples of such alternatives, see van Rensburg, P. (Ed)(1987), Another 
Development for Lesotho?  Alternative Development Strategies for the Mountain Kingdom, 
Gaberone, Foundation for Education with Production. 
 But facing up to South Africa's deeper responsibility to Lesotho is nevertheless 
crucial. This should not only follow the spirit of the 1998 Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which recommended that beneficiaries of apartheid should pay some form of 
reparation. More importantly, it would require a metamorphosis in terms of migrant labour, 
commercial and financial circuits of capital, geopolitics, widescale Free State province land 
restitution to displaced Basotho, and other aspects of long-overdue structural 
transformation in relations between South Africa and Lesotho. For more on this legacy, as 
well as on the World Bank's 1970s-80s contributions to Lesotho's underdevelopment, see 
Ferguson, J. (1991), The Anti-Politics Machine, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
and Cape Town, David Philip. 
 
. Again, the Alexandra residents did not explicitly address drought. But the first issue is 
whether the LHWP is an appropriate response, compared to planning for emergency water 
reductions. Capacity expansion should be based on accurate demand curves, rather than 
the myth that societies can always build themselves out of environmental contingencies, a 
philosophy that justifies unending supply-side increases. If a drought was extremely 
serious, Phase 1B would only save a few years from the inevitable reapplication of 1980s- 
and early-1990s-type water restrictions. 
 Yet this does not absolve South Africa's government from more proactive spatial 
planning, and from asking hard questions about whether Gauteng should continue to grow 
(especially as a water consumer). The most rigorous analysis of South Africa's economy, 
by Ben Fine and Zav Rustomjee, implies that Gauteng's and the country's early reliance on 
gold and upon a subsequent "Minerals-Energy Complex" is a version of "Dutch disease." In 
short, the large, export-oriented (to declining global markets) and highly capital-intensive 
projects associated with the Witwatersrand have done enormous damage to South Africa's 
development prospects. Since consumption of water by the Gauteng mining industry and 
ESKOM is central to the supply-side driven logic of the LHWP, the expenditure of further 
resources on the project should be seen from the standpoint of macroeconomic 
transformation, something entirely lacking thus far in official analysis. See Fine, B. and Z. 
Rustomjee (1996), The Political Economy of South Africa, Johannesburg, Wits University 
Press. The alternative, in the Reconstruction and Development Programme, was this 
mandate for regional, decentralised planning:  "Macro-economic policies must take into 
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consideration their effect upon the geographic distribution of economic activity. Additional 
strategies must address the excessive growth of the largest urban centres, the skewed 
distribution of population within rural areas, the role of small and medium-sized towns, and 
the future of declining towns and regions, and the apartheid dumping grounds" (African 
National Congress/Alliance [1994], Reconstruction and Development Programme, 
Johannesburg, Umanyamo Publications, Section 4.3.4). 
 
. In early 1994, the Reconstruction and Development Programme offered this mandate: 
The RDP must use foreign debt financing only for those elements of the 
programme that can potentially increase our capacity for earning foreign 
exchange. Relationships with international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund must be conducted in 
such a way as to protect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and 
promote the interests of the South African population and the economy. 
Above all, we must pursue policies that enhance national self-sufficiency 
and enable us to reduce dependence on international financial institutions 
(Section 6.5.2). 
 This promise was one of the first casualties of the post-apartheid era. 
 
 . The radical position here would be that, aside from gathering information, talking to the 
Bank is a distraction from the need to wage more vigorous, effective kinds of socio-
ecological struggle. The consultation issue is emblematic, for as the Panel put it, 
"`consultation' means just that:  it does not necessarily mean that the parties must agree on 
the issues in question, nor that the decision-makers must adopt any particular NGO's 
`perspective'" (paragraph 50). By way of contrast, South African civic associations once 
had a very clear response:  they insisted on rapidly moving from "consultation" to 
"participation" to "control." See Mayekiso, M. (1996), Township Politics:  Civic Struggles for 
a New South Africa, New York, Monthly Review (e.g., p.262). In their South Africa work, 
Bank officials rarely allowed matters to move beyond consultation. For a description of the 
failure of these two discourses to find common ground, see the article by Mark Swilling and 
Tshepiso Mashinini in BankCheck (January 1994), reporting on an early 1990s 
"consultation" session on Johannesburg township development: 
The discussion began with the Bank asking the civics the same set of 
technical questions that were posed to white local government officials, 
but obviously in a simpler form: population, level and standard of services, 
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not forthcoming. Instead, every civic representative emphasized the need 
for capacity building. 
 The problem lay in the way Bank staff asked the questions. As 
technical experts who deal in hard quantitative data every day, they 
related to the leaders of social movements as if they were local 
government officials whose every-day activity is the manipulation of 
organized data captured through established research methods. This is 
not what civic leaders do every day. 
 No one with community organizing experience would sit down at a 
first meeting with local leaders and ask: What are your needs? Instead, 
the questions would be: Comrades, what organizational structures do you 
have here? What struggles have you embarked upon? What were your 
demands when you went on the rent boycott? What were the demands in 
the petition you handed to the administration when you marched? What 
were your short-, medium- and long-term demands at the negotiations? 
What compromises did you accept, and why? What research are you 
doing to back up you demands?  
 Questions are asked in this way in order to tap organic knowledge 
about socio-economic conditions. Knowledge is inseparable from the 
rhythms of the daily struggle to transform local and regional conditions. 
However, civics do not have the resources to transform this practical and 
usable knowledge into quantitative data which really applies mainly to 
policy formulation. Even negotiation forums, where civics do have a use 
for hard data, are structured in a way that conventional quantitative 
information becomes a site of struggle. 
For a discussion of the weaknesses associated with the Inspection Panel in 1997-98, at a 
time sharp anti-Panel antagonism had emerged from (Southern) Bank Executive Directors 
who felt it was investigating aspects of governance that were causing discomfort in many 
(corrupt) governments, see Udall, L. (1997), The World Bank Inspection Panel: A Three 
Year Review, Washington, DC, Bank Information Center; and Treakle, K. (1998), 
Accountability at the World Bank: What Does It Take? Lessons from the Yacyreta 
Hydroelectric Project Argentina/Paraguay, Washington, DC, Bank Information Center. For 
background on the Inspection Panel's limits as an agent of change, covering the 1994-96 
period, see Udall, L. (1998), "The World Bank and Public Accountability:  Has Anything 
Changed?," in J.Fox and L.D. Brown (Eds), The Struggle for Accountability:  The World 
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Bank, NGOs and Grassroots Movements, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
 The position that the Bank should quit South Africa, in the wake of policy advice 
in macroeconomics, land reform, housing, infrastructure, welfare, public works, health 
policy, education and other fields, was not controversial. Sixty leading social movement 
activists signed a request to this effect in late 1996, as part of a "Campaign Against 
Neoliberalism in South Africa." See, e.g., Bond, P. (1997), "Against Neoliberalism in South 
Africa," Lokayan Bulletin, 14, 2; and Bond, P. (1999), Elite Transition, London, Pluto Press. 
 
. These political lessons may resonate loudly, given Asmal's role as chair of the World 
Commission on Dams, a point Roome made very clear to the Bank Executive Directors in 
the April 30, 1998 Project Appraisal Document (p. 18). 
 
. See, for examples of the former, Ballenger, J. (1998a), "Lesotho Water Project Falls 
Foul of Environmental Lobby Groups," Business Day, 22 January; and (1998b), "Social, 
Environmental Impact of Second Phase of Highlands Project Questioned, Business Day, 
19 March. For condescending reporting on the Phase 1B controversy, there was no better 
example than Barber, S. (1998), "Vote Asmal's Gov't out of Power, But Please, No 
Whining," Business Day, 9 September. 
